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BARGAINED JUSTICE: PLEA-BARGAINING’S INNOCENCE PROBLEM
AND THE BRADY SAFETY-VALVE
Lucian E. Dervan
INTRODUCTION
On January 17, 1959, James Zeno walked deliberately up three flights of
stairs and knocked on the door of Beatrice Lynumn’s Chicago apartment.2 Zeno,
who had been arrested by Chicago police for possession of narcotics earlier that
day, was acting as an informant in return for a promise of leniency. 3 Lynumn
opened the door and Zeno walked inside.4 After a brief interaction, Zeno left the
apartment with a package of marijuana under his arm.5
A few minutes later, Lynumn was in custody.6 Despite the strong evidence
provided by Zeno, she vehemently professed her innocence as police filed into her
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2
See Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 529 (1963).
3
See id. On January 17, 1959, three Chicago police officers arrested James Zeno for
unlawful possession of narcotics. They took him to a district police station. There they told
him that if he “would set somebody up for them, they would go light on him.” He agreed to
“cooperate” and telephoned [Lynumn], telling her that he was coming over to her
apartment. Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
See id. at 529–30. Officer Sims testified as follows:
He called Beatrice and said he had left his glasses in the apartment; she
opened the door and as she came out into the hall, I was standing in the common
hall, in the vestibule part with the door partly closed. As she walked down the
hallway toward Zeno, I opened the door and stepped into the hallway. I told her
she was under arrest and I grabbed her by her hands, both hands. At this point, I
told her that she had been set up, that she had just made a sale and I showed her
the package.
See id. at 529 n.1.
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apartment.7 At that moment, the issue of most concern to Lynumn was not her guilt
or innocence, however, but the fate of her children, ages three and four. 8 The
concern was particularly acute given that the children’s father had passed away and
Lynumn was raising them on her own.9 Perhaps seeing an opportunity, the police
began their interrogation right there in the apartment.10
Then he [the police officer] started telling me I could get 10 years and
the children could be taken away, and after I got out they would be taken
away and strangers would have them, and if I could cooperate he would
see they weren’t; and he would recommend leniency and I had better do
what they told me if I wanted to see my kids again.11
According to Lynumn, the offer of leniency and the belief that she would be
able to remain with her children created an overwhelming motivation to
cooperate.12 As a result, she confessed to the police in her apartment. Lynumn later
stated, “[t]he only reason I had for admitting [guilt] to the police was the hope of
saving myself from going to jail and being taken away from my children.”13
Lynumn later recanted her admission of guilt and proceeded to trial where,
despite her renewed proclamations of innocence, the confession was entered into
evidence.14 Rather than refute Lynumn’s account of the events, the police officers
involved admitted that the events had transpired largely as the defendant had
described. 15 Based on the weight of her earlier admission of guilt and Zeno’s
testimony, Lynumn was convicted and sentenced to not less than ten years in
prison. 16 Just as the officers had accurately predicted would occur during her

7

See id. at 530.
Id. at 531.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
See id. at 531–32.
13
Id. at 532.
14
See id. at 529.
15
See id. at 532. According to one officer:
8

I asked her who the clothing belonged to. She said they were her
children’s. I asked how many she had and she said 2. I asked her where they
were or who took care of them. She said the children were over at the mother’s
or mother-in-law. I asked her how did she take care of herself and she said she
was on ADC. I told her that if we took her into the station and charged her with
the offense, that the ADC would probably be cut off and also that she would
probably lose custody of her children. That was not before I said if she
cooperated, it would go light on her. It was during that conversation.
Id. at 533.
16
See id. at 529.
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arrest, Lynumn was sentenced to a decade behind bars for challenging the state to
prove her guilt in court rather than cooperating in her own prosecution.17
In 1963, the United States Supreme Court took up the issue of the
admissibility of Lynumn’s confession. 18 In a unanimous opinion, the Justices
concluded that the confession was inadmissible as a coerced, rather than voluntary,
statement.19 The Court stated, “[i]t is thus abundantly clear that the petitioner’s oral
confession was made only after the police had told her that state financial aid for
her infant children would be cut off, and her children taken from her, if she did not
‘cooperate.’ These threats were made while she was encircled in her apartment by
three police officers and a twice convicted felon who had purportedly ‘set her
up.’”20 Based on precedent establishing that confessions must be both voluntary
and intelligent, the Court stated that where the defendant’s “will was overborne at
the time [s]he confessed,” the confession cannot be deemed the product of a
“rational intellect and a free will.” 21 The court concluded that it was a blatant
violation of the United States Constitution for the police to threaten Lynumm with
the reality of the situation if she failed to cooperate through confession, even
though they were correct when they told her that she faced a possible sentence of
ten years in prison which would result in her losing custody of her children.22
In 2004, just over forty years after the Lynumn case, another mother of two
small children was brought before the criminal justice system, and, once again, she
was threatened with ten years in prison unless she agreed to cooperate.23 Also like
Lynumn, the threat of ten years in prison meant that her children would be without
both parents.24 As might be expected, the defendant once again acquiesced to the
demands of her accusers, yet this time the Supreme Court was silent.25
Lea Fastow served as Director and Assistant Treasurer of Corporate Finance
at the now infamous Texas energy trading company Enron from 1991 until 1997.26
Her husband, Andrew Fastow, was also an integral part of the corporation and
served as Chief Financial Officer from 1997 until the corporation’s collapse in

17

See id. at 531 (“Then he started telling me I could get 10 years and the children
could be taken away . . .”).
18
See id. at 528.
19
Id. at 534.
20
Id.
21
Id. (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960)).
22
See id. (“We think it clear that a confession made under such circumstances must
be deemed not voluntary, but coerced.”).
23
See Michelle S. Jacobs, Loyalty’s Reward—A Felony Conviction: Recent
Prosecutions of High-Status Female Offenders, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 843, 857 (2006);
Mary Flood, Lea Fastow in Plea-Bargain Talks; Former Enron CFO’s Wife Could Get 5Month Term but Deal Faces Hurdles, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 7, 2003, at A1.
24
See Jacobs, supra note 23, at 857.
25
See Mary Flood, Wife of Former Enron Chief Financial Officer Begins Prison
Sentence in Houston, HOUS. CHRON., July 13, 2004, at A1.
26
Jacobs, supra note 23, at 856.
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2001. 27 Although Lea Fastow was a stay-at-home mother raising two small
children in 2001, federal investigators determined that she had known of her
husband’s fraudulent financial dealings and had even assisted him in perpetrating
the frauds. 28 In response, the government indicted Lea Fastow along with her
husband, who had already been charged with ninety-eight counts of criminal
conduct.29 Lea Fastow’s indictment contained six counts, including conspiracy to
commit wire fraud and defraud the United States, money laundering conspiracy,
aiding and abetting, and filing a false tax return.30
Conviction on all six counts of the indictment would result in a prison term of
up to ten years, but the government was more interested in persuading Lea Fastow
to cooperate than in convicting her.31 As a result, the government offered her a
deal. 32 In return for confessing her guilt in court, the prosecution would only
charge her with a single count of filing a false tax return and the government
would recommend a sentence of one year of supervised release.33 The deal also
included an agreement that Lea Fastow and her husband, who also intended to
plead guilty in return for leniency, would not have to serve their prison sentences
simultaneously, thus ensuring their children would always have one parent at
27
28

Id.
See id. at 856–57.

During the time in question, Andrew Fastow and Michael Kopper created
several Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) to hold off-balance sheet treatment of
assets held by Enron. . . . Ms. Fastow assisted with concealing the fraudulent
nature of two of the SPEs. In both cases, Ms. Fastow accepted “gifts” in her
name and in the names of her children, knowing that the gifts were kickbacks.
In another instance, the Fastows were attempting to hide the fact that Ms.
Fastow’s father was used as an “independent” third party of RADR. When the
Fastows realized that the father’s ownership would trigger a reporting
requirement, they had him pull out of the deal. Ms. Fastow convinced her father
to file a false tax return in an effort to continue hiding their involvement in the
SPE.
Id.; see also Flood, supra note 23, at A1.
29
See Indictment, United States v. Fastow (S.D. Tex. 2004) (Cr. No. H-03-150),
available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/usleafstw43003
ind.pdf (last visited July 13, 2010).
30
Id.
31
The ten-year sentence is calculated using the 2002 sentencing guidelines for fraud.
Beginning with a base offense level of six points, Fastow would have received twenty
points for a $17 million loss and four points for an offense involving more than fifty
people. A defendant with no previous criminal history and thirty points has a sentencing
range between 97–121 months. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1
(2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2002_guidelines/2002_manual.cfm.
32
See Flood, supra note 23, at A1.
33
See Bruce Zucker, Settling Federal Criminal Cases in the Post-Enron Era: The
Role of the Court and Probation Office in Plea Bargaining Federal White Collar Cases, 6
FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2004).
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home.34 As the lead prosecutor in the case stated, “[t]he Fastows’ children can be
taken into account in deciding when Andrew Fastow will begin serving his
sentence. There is no reason for the government, when it can [avoid it], to have a
husband and wife serve their sentences at the same time.”35
For Lea Fastow, the reality of her situation removed any free will she might
have had to weigh her options.36 With two small children at home and the prospect
that she and her husband might both be in prison at the same time, the decision to
accept the offer was made for her.37 As one family friend stated, “[i]t’s a matter of
willing to risk less when it’s for her children than she would risk if it were just for
herself.” 38 As such, she succumbed to the pressure to confess her guilt and
accepted the deal.39
Eventually, the judge forced the government to revise its offer because he
believed five months was too lenient.40 As a result, Lea Fastow pleaded guilty to a
misdemeanor tax charge and was sentenced to one year in prison. Nevertheless, the
agreement to confess her guilt in return for a promise of leniency lessened her
sentence by nine years and ensured her children would not be without a parent.41
As promised, Andrew Fastow was not required to report to prison for his offenses
until after Lea Fastow was released.42
34

Jacobs, supra note 23, at 859 (“During the renegotiation of the second plea, it was
widely reported that Ms. Fastow was interested in a plea that would allow her children to
stay at home with one parent while the other was incarcerated, rather than running the risk
that both parents would be incarcerated at the same time. The government apparently
acquiesced to this request.”).
35
Mary Flood & Clifford Pugh, Lea Fastow Expresses “Regret” at Sentencing; Wife
of ex-Enron CFO Faces Years in Prison, HOUS. CHRON., May 7, 2004, at A1.
36
See Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (“[T]he question in each case is whether
the defendant’s will was overborne at the time he confessed. If so, the confession cannot be
deemed ‘the product of a rational intellect and a free will.’” (citations omitted) (quoting
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960))).
37
See Greg Farrell & Jayne O’Donnell, Plea Deals Appear Close for Fastows; Could
Mean Task Force on Verge of Filing More Charges, USA TODAY, Jan. 8, 2004, at B.01
(“One of the reasons that Lea Fastow wants to limit her jail time to five months is that she
and her husband have two young children, and they’re trying to structure their pleas so
they’re not both in jail at the same time.”).
38
Flood, supra note 23, at A1 (“A family friend previously said Lea Fastow is willing
to consider pleading guilty and forgoing a chance to tell her side to a jury because it would
be better for her two small children and could ensure they would not be without a parent at
home.”).
39
See Mary Flood, Fastows to Plead Guilty Today; Feds Now Focus on Skilling, Lay,
HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 14, 2004, at A1 (“The plea bargains for the Fastows, who said they
wanted to be sure their two children are not left parentless, have been in limbo for more
than a week.”).
40
See Farrell & O’Donnell, supra note 37, at B.01 (“U.S. Judge David Hittner told
Lea Fastow Wednesday that he refused to be locked in to the five-month prison sentence
that her lawyers had negotiated with prosecutors.”); Flood, supra note 25, at A1.
41
See Farrell & O’Donnell, supra note 37, at B.01; Flood, supra note 25, at A1.
42
See Flood, supra note 25, at A1.
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In a 1942 Supreme Court case, the Justices wrote, “a plea of guilty coerced by
a federal law enforcement officer is no more consistent with due process than a
conviction supported by a coerced confession.”43 Yet Lea Fastow’s guilty plea, the
product of the same threats the Supreme Court found coercive forty years before,
was simply assumed by everyone involved to be constitutional. This type of
assumption seems well supported, as Lea Fastow’s guilty plea represents just one
of hundreds of thousands of similiar deals entered into by prosecutors and
defendants every year in the American criminal justice system.44 The first question
this Article seeks to answer, therefore, is how and why the Supreme Court shifted
from being a protector of coerced defendants to being a supporter of the plea
bargaining machine.45 The answer involves a great compromise by the Justices in
1970, a compromise necessitated by strains on the criminal justice system resulting
from the additional rights afforded to defendants during the Warren Court’s due
process revolution and the crushing and ever-increasing number of criminal
prosecutions in America.46 The great compromise was to allow prosecutors and
defendants to bargain for justice in hopes this might alleviate pressures on the
system while simultaneously benefitting clearly guilty defendants willing to reap
an advantage in return for an admission of guilt.47
Unfortunately, the plea bargaining system has not evolved as the Justices had
hoped.48 Rather than a system in which guilty defendants bargain for a mutually
beneficial outcome and innocent defendants wage forward toward trial in hopes of
acquittal, the plea bargaining system has come to engulf almost everyone.49 Today,
the incentives to bargain are powerful enough to force even an innocent defendant
to falsely confess guilt in hopes of leniency and in fear of reprisal.50 The second
question this Article seeks to answer, therefore, is whether, in 1970, the Supreme
Court was willing to permit the incentives offered for bargaining to become so
powerful as to induce even innocent defendants to plead guilty.51
43

Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942).
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS, at fig.C (2009), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/
Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2009/SBTOC09.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2012) (stating
that in 2009, 96.3% of federal defendants pleaded guilty). For a discussion of scholarship
on plea bargaining generally and the debate over whether plea bargaining is an appropriate
part of our criminal justice system, see Jacqueline E. Ross, The Entrenched Position of
Plea Bargaining in United States Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 717 (2006).
45
See infra Part II (examining the Supreme Court’s great plea bargaining compromise
of 1970).
46
See infra Part II.B (examining the reasons for the Supreme Court’s decision in
United State v. Brady).
47
See infra Part II.B.
48
See infra Part III (examining plea bargaining’s innocence problem).
49
See infra Part III.A (examining the prevalence of innocent defendants pleading
guilty).
50
See infra Part III.
51
See infra Part III.B (examining the Supreme Court’s safety-valve in United States v.
Brady).
44
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In answering this question, this Article proposes that the Supreme Court in
Brady specifically contemplated the possibility that prosecutors would utilize the
plea bargaining system in an impermissible manner and, as a result, created both a
safety-valve and a litmus test for a failure of the safety-valve.52 The Brady safetyvalve limits the amount of pressure that may be asserted against defendants by
prohibiting prosecutors from offering incentives in return for guilty pleas that are
so coercive as to overbear defendants’ abilities to act freely. 53 The number of
innocent defendants who are induced to falsely confess their guilt is a litmus test to
determine when prosecutors have applied excessive pressure and the safety-valve
has failed.54 The Brady Court stated that if the plea bargaining system began to
operate in a manner resulting in a significant number of innocent defendants
pleading guilty, the Court would reexamine the constitutionality of bargained
justice. 55 The significant innocence problem that plea bargaining has today
indicates that the Brady safety-valve has failed and, as a result, the constitutionality
of modern day plea bargaining is in great doubt.56
In Part I, this Article examines the rise of plea bargaining in America and
explores the forces behind this jurisprudential revolution.57 In Part II, this Article
analyzes Supreme Court precedent regarding plea bargaining dating back to the
1800s. 58 In so doing, this Article demonstrates that the Supreme Court was
strongly opposed to bargained justice for over a century prior to its great
compromise of 1970. 59 Finally, in Part III, this Article examines a significant
portion of the Supreme Court’s great compromise that has gone largely unnoticed
by scholars, practitioners, and judges.60 The Supreme Court created a safety-valve
in 1970 to ensure that the pressures placed on defendants to plead guilty would
never reach impermissible levels.61 As this Part demonstrates, there is a significant
innocence problem with plea bargaining today. This being the case, the Brady
safety-valve may not be working and, if so, defendants, both innocent and guilty,
are being offered unconstitutional incentives to confess.62

52

See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.B.
54
See infra Part III.B.
55
See infra Part III.B.
56
See infra notes 257–261 (examining the literature regarding plea bargaining’s
current innocence problem).
57
See infra Part I.
58
See infra Part II.
59
See infra Part II.
60
See infra Part III.
61
See infra Part III. For purposes of this article, the terms “innocent” and “innocence”
are used to refer to any defendant who would not have been convicted at trial. Of course,
this is not to say a defendant is necessarily free of moral culpability or responsibility for the
charged conduct. Nevertheless, the terms “innocent” and “innocence” herein serve as terms
to discuss those who are not criminally liable in the eyes of the law.
62
See infra Part III.
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I. THE RISE OF THE PLEA BARGAINING MACHINE
Before delving deeply into Supreme Court plea bargaining precedent, it is
important to understand the rise and operation of the modern day plea bargaining
machine. Of particular significance is the fact that plea bargaining began its rise to
dominance well before it had been approved as a form of justice by the Supreme
Court in 1970. In fact, plea bargaining began to grow in popularity during periods
of American history when Supreme Court precedent specifically found the practice
of offering incentives for defendants to plead guilty unconstitutional.63
A. The Historical Rise of Plea Bargaining
The evolution of plea bargaining into a force that affects over 95 percent of
defendants in the American criminal justice system took place mainly in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.64 While the right to plead guilty dates back to
English common law traditions, a new phenomenon began to appear in America
shortly after the Civil War. It was during this period that state courts began
witnessing an influx of appellate cases dealing with apparent “bargains” between
defendants and prosecutors.65 With resounding frequency, these early experiments
with bargained justice were rejected by the judiciary as demonstrated by the case
excerpts below.66
The least surprise of influence causing [the defendant] to plead guilty
when he had any defense at all should be sufficient cause to permit a
change of the plea from guilty to not guilty.67

63

See infra Part II.B (discussing the Supreme Court’s rejection of bargained justice
prior to 1970).
64
See John Baldwin & Michael McConville, Plea Bargaining and Plea Negotiation
in England, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 287, 287–91 (1979); Lucian E. Dervan, Plea
Bargaining’s Survival: Financial Crimes Plea Bargaining, A Continued Triumph in a
Post-Enron World, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 451, 478 (2007); Mark H. Haller, Plea Bargaining:
The Nineteenth Century Context, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 273, 273 (1979) (“[Alschuler and
Friedman] agree that plea bargaining was probably nonexistent before 1800, began to
appear during the early or mid-nineteenth century, and became institutionalized as a
standard feature of American urban criminal courts in the last third of the nineteenth
century.”); John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 261, 261–62 (1979); Lynn M. Mather, Comments on the History of
Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 281, 81–83 (1979).
65
See Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
19 (1979) (“It was only after the Civil War that cases of plea bargaining began to appear in
American appellate court reports.”).
66
See id. at 19–21.
67
Id. at 20.
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No sort of pressure can be permitted to bring the party to forego any right
or advantage however slight. The law will not suffer the least weight to
be put in the scale against him.68
[W]hen there is reason to believe that the plea has been entered through
inadvertence . . . and mainly from the hope that the punishment to which
the accused would otherwise be exposed may thereby be mitigated, the
Court should be indulgent in permitting the plea to be withdrawn.69
Despite these early defeats for plea bargaining, the idea of bargained justice
did not die. On the contrary, though infrequent by today’s standards, plea
bargaining continued to exist in the local and district court systems.70
By the turn of the century, plea bargaining was on the rise, but not because it
served mutually beneficial considerations of prosecutors and defendants or because
it advanced judicial economy. 71 Plea bargaining began to thrive in the early
twentieth century because judges and prosecutors began accepting bribes from
defendants in return for “plea agreements” that guaranteed reduced sentences.
According to Professor Albert Alschuler, “[t]he gap between these judicial
denunciations of plea bargaining [in the late nineteenth century] and the practices
of many urban courts at the turn of the century and thereafter was apparently
extreme. In these courts, striking political corruption apparently contributed to a
flourishing practice of plea bargaining.”72
While corruption introduced plea bargaining to the broader legal community,
it was the rise in criminal cases before and during Prohibition that spurred its
growth and made it a legal necessity.73 Between the early twentieth century and
1925, the number of cases in the federal system resulting in pleas of guilty rose
sharply from 50 to 90 percent.74 In return for defendants’ assistance in moving a
68

Id.
Id. In an 1877 Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, the court stated that plea
bargaining was “hardly, if at all, distinguishable in principle from a direct sale of justice.”
Id. at 21 (quoting Wight v. Rindskopf, 43 Wis. 344, 354 (1877)).
70
See id. at 22.
71
See id. at 24.
72
See id.
73
See id. at 27; GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA
BARGAINING IN AMERICA 210–12 (2003).
69

[F]ederal prosecutions under the Prohibition Act terminated in 1930 had
become nearly eight times as many as the total of all pending federal
prosecutions in 1914. In a number of urban districts the enforcement agencies
maintain that the only practicable way of meeting this situation with the existing
machinery of federal courts . . . is for the United States Attorneys to make
bargains with defendants or their counsel whereby defendants plead guilty to
minor offenses and escape with light penalties . . . .
Alschuler, supra note 65, at 32.
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flood of cases through an overwhelmed system, they were often permitted to plead
guilty to lesser charges or given lighter sentences. 75 As Prohibition was
extinguished, the United States continued its drive to create new criminal laws, a
phenomenon that only added to the courts’ growing case loads and the pressure to
continue to use bargaining to move cases through the system.76
By 1967, the American Bar Association (ABA) was proclaiming the benefits
of plea bargaining, even though it had not, as of yet, been specifically approved by
the Supreme Court.77 The ABA stated:
[A] high proportion of pleas of guilty and nolo contendere does benefit
the system. Such pleas tend to limit the trial process to deciding real
disputes and, consequently, to reduce the need for funds and personnel.
If the number of judges, courtrooms, court personnel and counsel for
prosecution and defense were to be increased substantially, the funds
necessary for such increases might be diverted from elsewhere in the
criminal justice process. Moreover, the limited use of the trial process
for those cases in which the defendant has grounds for contesting the
matter of guilty aids in preserving the meaningfulness of the
presumption of innocence.78
By the time the Supreme Court agreed that plea bargaining was an available
form of justice in 1970, plea bargaining’s rise to dominance was already complete.
The Brady decision was delivered in the shadows of a force that led 90 percent of

74

See Alschuler, supra note 65, at 27 (“By 1925, the percentage of convictions by
guilty plea had reached almost 90 . . . .”).
75
See id. at 28 (“The rewards associated with pleas of guilty were manifested not only
in the lesser offenses of which guilty-plea defendants were convicted but also in the lighter
sentences that they received.”).
76
See id. at 33 (“Dean Pound observed that ‘of one hundred thousand persons arrested
in Chicago in 1912, more than one half were held for violation of legal precepts which did
not exist twenty-five years before.’”); see also Donald A. Dripps, Overcriminalization,
Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible Exit Strategies, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1155,
1156–61 (2005) (discussing the relationship between broadening legal rules and plea
bargaining); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 505, 519–20 (2001) (discussing the influence of broader laws on the rate of plea
bargaining); Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal
Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 129 (2005) (“Changes in federal sentencing
practices during the 1980s and 1990s increased the certainty and size of the penalty for
going to trial, and mightily influenced the guilty plea and acquittal rates during those
times.”).
77
See AM. BAR ASS’N PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY 2 (1968) [hereinafter ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE].
78
Id.
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criminal defendants in the 1960s to waive their right to trial and confess their guilt
in court.79
B. The Force Behind Plea Bargaining’s Rise
As demonstrated in the previous subpart, plea bargaining rose to dominate the
American criminal justice system in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. But
how did members of the legal system succeeded in making plea bargaining
attractive to defendants? Today, a general consensus has evolved within plea
bargaining scholarship that plea bargaining became a dominant force as a result of
prosecutors gaining increasing power and control in an ever more complex
criminal justice system. 80 As prosecutors’ powers to both operate within and
manipulate the system grew, their ability to create incentives for defendants to
plead guilty also escalated. The key element of this machine, of course, is
prosecutorial discretion and the ability to select from various criminal statutes with
significantly different sentences.81
79

Diana Borteck, Pleas for DNA Testing: Why Lawmakers Should Amend State PostConviction DNA Testing Statutes to Apply to Prisoners Who Pled Guilty, 25 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1429, 1439 n.43 (2004) (citing Corinna Barrett Lain, Accuracy Where It Matters:
Brady v. Maryland in the Plea Bargaining Context, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 1 (2002)) (noting
“that since the 1960s the plea bargaining rate has been around ninety percent”); see ABA
PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 77, at 1–2 (“The plea of guilty
is probably the most frequent method of conviction in all jurisdictions; in some localities as
many as 95 per cent of the criminal cases are disposed of in this way.”). Today, guilty pleas
account for over 95 percent of all federal cases. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note
44, at fig.C.
80
For instance, through analysis of plea bargaining in Massachusetts, Professor
George Fisher argues that as the criminal justice system became more sophisticated,
prosecutors gained the power to use selective charge bargaining to offer reduced sentences
for those willing to negotiate. See FISHER, supra note 73, at 210 (“[Sentencing Guidelines]
invest prosecutors with the power, moderated only by the risk of loss at trial, to dictate
many sentences simply by choosing one set of charges over another.”); Alschuler, supra
note 65, at 40; Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 13 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 211 (1979); Dervan, supra note 64, at 478.
81
For a discussion of charge bargaining and its use by prosecutors, see Mary P.
Brown & Stevan E. Bunnell, Negotiating Justice: Prosecutorial Perspectives on Federal
Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1063, 1066–67 (2006)
(“Like most plea agreements in federal or state courts, the standard D.C. federal plea
agreement starts by identifying the charges to which the defendant will plead guilty and the
charges or potential charges that the government in exchange agrees not to prosecute.”);
Joy A. Boyd, Power, Policy, and Practice: The Department of Justice’s Plea Bargaining
Policy as Applied to the Federal Prosecutor’s Power Under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines, 56 ALA. L. REV. 591, 592 (2004) (“Not only may a prosecutor choose whether
to pursue any given case, but she also decides which charges to file.”); Jon J. Lambiras,
White-Collar Crime: Why the Sentencing Disparity Despite Uniform Guidelines?, 30 PEPP.
L. REV. 459, 512 (2003) (“Charging decisions are a critical sentencing matter and are left
solely to the discretion of the prosecutor. When determining which charges to bring,
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While prosecutors possessed the ability to control charging decisions and
sentencing recommendations throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
their power to control the criminal justice system and offer defendants deals
increased throughout the 1900s.82 For example, as the number of criminal statutes
grew during the early twentieth century, prosecutors had more choices when
charging defendants and more discretion when selecting reduced charges in return
for guilty pleas.83 A further example is the implementation of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines in the last decade of the twentieth century, a tool that
greatly increased prosecutors’ control of the system and increased their ability to
force defendants into plea agreements.84
Before the advent of modern sentencing guidelines, both prosecutor
and judge held some power to bargain without the other’s
cooperation . . . . Today, sentencing guidelines have recast whole chunks
of the criminal code in the mold of the old Massachusetts liquor laws.
By assigning a fixed and narrow penalty range to almost every definable
offense, sentencing guidelines often empower prosecutors to dictate a
defendant’s sentence by manipulating the charges. Guidelines have
unsettled the old balance of bargaining power among prosecutor, judge,
and defendant by ensuring that the prosecutor, who always had the
strongest interest in plea bargaining, now has almost unilateral power to
deal.85

prosecutors may often choose from more than one statutory offense.”); Geraldine S.
Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: Lessons from Current White Collar
Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 177 (2004) (“The power of
the prosecutor to charge is two-fold; the power to indict or not . . . and the power to decide
what offenses to charge.”).
82
See FISHER, supra note 73, at 16–17.
83
See Alschuler, supra note 65, at 32 (“Dean Pound observed that ‘of one hundred
thousand persons arrested in Chicago in 1912, more than one half were held for violation of
legal precepts which did not exist twenty-five years before.’”).
84
See FISHER, supra note 73, at 17.
85
FISHER, supra note 73, at 17; see also Boyd, supra note 81, at 591–92 (“While the
main focus on the Sentencing Guidelines appeared to be narrowing judicial discretion in
sentencing, some critics argued that the Sentencing Guidelines merely shifted the federal
judge’s discretionary power to federal prosecutors.”); Marc L. Miller, Domination &
Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1252 (2004) (“The
overwhelming and dominant fact of the federal sentencing system, beyond the Commission
and the guidelines and mandatory penalties, is the virtually absolute power the system has
given prosecutors over federal prosecution and sentencing.”).
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While defendants also play an important role in the plea bargaining process,
prosecutors’ control of charging decisions and their influence over sentencing are
key elements that contributed to the system’s dominance.86
Prosecutors have been successful in using their increased powers to create
incentives that attract defendants to plead guilty by structuring plea agreements
where the sentence a defendant receives in return for pleading guilty is far lower
than the sentence he or she risks with a loss at trial.87 In a 1981 article on plea
bargaining, Professor Albert Alschuler wrote of this “sentencing differential” and
stated, “[c]riminal defendants today plead guilty in overwhelming numbers
primarily because they perceive that this action is likely to lead to more lenient
treatment than would follow conviction at trial. A number of studies suggest this
perception is justified.” 88 Among these studies was an examination by David
Brereton and Jonathan Casper that analyzed robbery and burglary defendants in
three California jurisdictions. 89 The results were striking and illustrated that
defendants who exercised their constitutional right to a trial received significantly
higher sentences than those who worked with prosecutors to reach an agreement.90
86

See FISHER, supra note 73, at 230 (“[P]lea bargaining grew so entrenched in the
halls of power that today, though its patrons may divide its spoils in different ways, it can
grow no more. For plea bargaining has won.”).
87
See Stephanos Bibas, Bringing Moral Values into a Flawed Plea-Bargaining
System, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1425, 1425 (2003) (“The criminal justice system uses large
sentence discounts to induce guilty pleas. Of course these discounts exert pressure on
defendants to plead guilty.”); Lucian E. Dervan, The Surprising Lessons from Plea
Bargaining in the Shadow of Terror, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 239, 242 (2011). Along with
sentencing differentials, of course, are considerations by the defendant of the likelihood of
success at trial. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2465 (2004) (“In short, the classic shadow-of-trial model predicts that
the likelihood of conviction at trial and the likely post-trial sentence largely determine plea
bargains.”).
88
Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV.
652, 652–56 (1981). Alschuler goes on to state, “Although the empirical evidence is not of
one piece, the best conclusion probably is that in a great many cases the sentence
differential in America assumes shocking proportions.” Id. at 654–56; see also Jenia I.
Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP.
L. 199, 251 (2006) (“While practitioners disagree about the acceptability of a large
sentence differential between the post-plea and post-trial sentence, they agree that such a
differential is common.”).
89
See David Brereton & Jonathan D. Casper, Does it Pay to Plead Guilty?
Differential Sentencing and the Functioning of Criminal Courts, 16 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 45,
55–59 (1981); see also H. Joo Shin, Do Lesser Pleas Pay?: Accommodations in the
Sentencing and Parole Process, 1 J. CRIM. JUST. 27, 40 (1973) (finding that charge
reduction directly results in reduction of the maximum sentence available and indirectly
results in lesser actual time served).
90
See Brereton & Casper, supra note 89, at 55–59; see also Daniel Givelber,
Punishing Protestations of Innocence: Denying Responsibility and Its Consequences, 37
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1363, 1382 (2000) (“The differential in sentencing between those who
plead and those convicted after trial reflects the judgment that defendants who insist upon a
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Not limiting themselves to a mere observation of sentencing trends, the researchers
also made an insightful statement regarding the impact of high differentials on the
rates of plea bargaining.
The point of the preceding discussion is simple enough: when guilty plea
rates are high, expect to find differential sentencing. We believe that
recent arguments to the effect that differentials are largely illusory do not
withstand serious scrutiny, even though this revisionist challenge has
been valuable in forcing us to examine more closely what is too often
taken to be self-evidently true.91
Significant differentials, Brereton and Casper argued, are a tool used to increase
plea bargaining rates by increasing the incentives for negotiation.92
Thus, plea bargaining’s rise to dominance during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries resulted from prosecutors gaining increased power over the criminal
justice system and, through such power, the ability to offer increasingly significant
incentives to those willing to confess their guilt in court. Today, sentencing
differentials have reached new heights and, as a result, the incentives for
defendants to plead guilty are greater than at any previous point in the history of
our criminal justice system.93 It should be no surprise, therefore, that every year
more than 95 percent of defendants accept the government’s offers of leniency and
plead guilty rather than risk the consequences of failure at trial.94

trial are doing something blameworthy.”); Tung Yin, Not a Rotten Carrot: Using Charges
Dismissed Pursuant to a Plea Agreement in Sentencing Under the Federal Guidelines, 83
CALIF. L. REV. 419, 443 (1995) (“Curiously, the arena of plea bargaining pits the concepts
of duress and consideration against each other: a large sentencing differential makes it
more likely that a defendant is coerced into pleading guilty, and yet it also increases the
benefit offered in exchange for the guilty plea.”).
91
Brereton & Casper, supra note 89, at 69.
92
See id. at 45 (“It is this sentence differential (whether conceived of as a reward to
guilty pleaders or as a punishment of those who waste the court’s time by ‘needless’ trials)
which has traditionally been seen as the engine driving the plea-bargaining assembly
line.”); see also Givelber, supra note 90, at 1382 (“The pragmatic justification for
differential sentencing is simple and powerful: we want those charged with crimes to plead
guilty, and differential sentencing provides an accused with a strong incentive to do just
that.”).
93
See Dervan, supra note 64, at 478–88. Along with increasing sentencing
differentials, increasingly severe sentences have also increased the motivation for
defendants to accept offers of leniency. See id.
94
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 44, at fig.C.
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II. THE SUPREME COURT’S GREAT COMPROMISE
REGARDING PLEA BARGAINING
A. The Court’s Early Rejection of Bargained Justice
While plea-bargaining quickly grew in prominence within the trenches of the
criminal justice system during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Supreme
Court was much slower and more deliberate with its consideration of this new
form of justice. In fact, for much of the time period during which plea-bargaining
was rising from obscurity to prominence, the Supreme Court considered this
bargained justice unconstitutional. 95 This, of course, did not prevent judges,
prosecutors, and defendants from continuing to bargain in the shadows, a
phenomenon which eventually became a significant reason for the Supreme
Court’s sudden embrace of plea-bargaining in 1970.96
The starting place for a historical analysis of the jurisprudence of pleabargaining is actually within the law of confession.97 This is because up until the
twentieth century, guilty pleas were simply considered a form of confession that
occurred inside a courtroom. 98 Professor Albert Alschuler addressed the link
between the law of confession and guilty pleas in his 1979 work regarding the
history of plea-bargaining.99 “[W]hile the legal phenomenon that we call a guilty
plea has existed for more than eight centuries, the term ‘guilty plea’ came into
common use only about one century ago. During the previous 700 years, what we
call a guilty plea was simply called a ‘confession.’”100
The most noteworthy pre-American common law case regarding confession is
the 1783 English case of Rex v. Warickshall. 101 In this case, the English court
stated that confessions are improper and inadmissible where they are induced by
“promises of favor.”102 The court continued, “[A] confession forced from the mind
by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape

95

See infra text accompanying notes 124–197.
See infra text accompanying notes 136–138, 221–236.
97
See Alschuler, supra note 65, at 12. Professor Alschuler’s article contains a
gripping account of the link between the law of confession and the law of guilty pleas.
Although I will examine many of the same cases, this Article will focus more squarely on
the issue of voluntariness as that term has evolved throughout the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. See infra Part III (discerning the current meaning of the term “voluntary”
through consideration of the history of plea bargaining case law as discussed in Part II.A.).
98
See Alschuler, supra note 65, at 12.
99
Id. at 12–13.
100
Id.; see also Loftus E. Becker, Jr., Plea Bargaining and the Supreme Court, 21
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 757, 776 (1988) (“Time and again, the Court analogized ‘involuntary’
guilty pleas to ‘compelled’ self-incrimination, to ‘coerced’ confessions and to the
‘involuntary’ waiver of constitutional rights in general.”).
101
(1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 1 Leach 263.
102
Id. at 234, 1 Leach at 263.
96
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. . . that no credit ought to be given to it.”103 Thus, the concept that confessions and
guilty pleas must be voluntary was born.104
It was not until 1892 that the United States Supreme Court affirmed a guilty
plea by a defendant in the matter of Hallinger v. Davis,105 wherein the Supreme
Court clarified that the high standard for the admissibility of confessions utilized in
England was equally applicable to a guilty plea in America. 106 Hallinger was
indicted by a grand jury in New Jersey for murder.107 Shortly thereafter, he entered
a guilty plea to the charges.108 The lower court was so uncomfortable with the idea
of a defendant waving his or her right to trial, however, that it held the plea in
abeyance and required the defendant to consult with counsel. 109 Following the
consultation, Hallinger again requested to plead guilty.110 After hearing testimony
regarding the basis for the defendant’s plea, the court accepted the confession and
sentenced Hallinger to death.111 In considering the case, the United States Supreme
Court concluded that the defendant had “voluntarily” availed himself of the option
to plead guilty and, while perhaps unwise, the decision did not violate any
provisions of the Constitution.112 Hallinger was the first case in which the Supreme
103

Id. at 235, 1 Leach at 264.
See Alschuler, supra note 65, at 12 (discussing Rex, 168 Eng. Rep. at 255, 1 Leach
at 263–64). “It soon became clear that any confession ‘obtained by [a] direct or implied
promise[], however slight’ could not be received in evidence. Even the offer of a glass of
gin was a ‘promise of leniency’ capable of coercing a confession.” Id. (citations omitted);
see also Baldwin & McConville, supra note 64, at 287–91 (discussing the use of plea
bargaining in England).
105
Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314, 324 (1892).
106
See id. at 318–20. One of the earliest American cases discussing the need for guilty
pleas to be voluntary was an 1804 Massachusetts Supreme Court case titled
Commonwealth v. Battis, 1 Mass. 95, 95 (1804). Battis, an African American, was indicted
in Massachusetts for the rape and murder of a thirteen-year-old Caucasian girl. Id. Upon
being brought to court to answer the charges, Battis pleaded guilty. Id. Surprised by the
defendant’s actions, the court remanded Battis to prison to reconsider his decision. Id. at
95–96. Later that day, Battis was brought back before the judge and again pleaded guilty.
Id. at 96. After thorough questioning, it was determined that there had been no “tampering
with him, either by promises, persuasions, or hopes of pardon, if he would plead guilty.”
Id. The court accepted the plea and Battis was sentenced to death. Id. The Battis case
provides a glimpse into criminal practice in the nineteenth century and demonstrates that
courts were reluctant to permit defendants to plead guilty. See id. Further, when such guilty
pleas were permitted, they were only allowed where it was clear the defendant had been
offered no promises and had endured no threats in deciding to confess his or her crime. See
id.
107
Hallinger, 146 U.S. at 315 (“Hallinger, the appellant, was on the 14th day of April,
1891, indicted by the grand jury of Hudson County for the murder of one Mary
Hallinger.”).
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id. (“[H]e was condemned to be hanged.”).
112
Id. at 324.
104
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Court concluded that pleas of guilty must be “voluntary,” a legal doctrine drawn
directly from the English law of confession.113
Though the Supreme Court failed to define the term “voluntary” with any
precision in Hallinger, it was not necessary. At the time, one needed only examine
case law regarding the definition of the term “voluntary” in the context of
confessions, because, as described above, guilty pleas were simply in-court
confessions in the eyes of the law.114 One such case was the 1897 case of Bram v.
United States.115 Bram was accused of murdering a ship’s captain and others.116
During his trial, the prosecution admitted a confession Bram made to police,
though Bram protested that the confession had been extracted from him
involuntarily.117 In ruling on the matter, the Supreme Court referred to the long
history of case law establishing that one may not be compelled to testify against
himself.118
But a confession, in order to be admissible, must be free and voluntary:
that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats of violence, nor
obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the
exertion of any improper influence. . . . [F]or the law cannot measure the
force of the influence used, or decide upon its effect upon the mind of
the prisoner . . . .119
According to the Court, the “true test of admissibility is that the confession is made
freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any sort.”120 In the
Bram case, the detective was found to have held out hope of leniency in return for
Bram disclosing the identity of his accomplice. 121 The Court concluded that
113

See id.; see also Alschuler, supra note 65, at 10 (noting that this was also the first
U.S. case to uphold a guilty plea).
114
See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.
115
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
116
Id. at 537.
117
Id. at 538–39.
118
See id. at 545 (“There can be no doubt that long prior to our independence the
doctrine that one accused of crime could not be compelled to testify against himself had
reached its full development in common law. . . .”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
119
Bram, 168 U.S. at 542–43 (quoting 3 RUSSELL ON CRIMES 478 (6th ed.)).
120
Id. at 548 (quoting Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 623 (1896)). Citing to
Rex v. Thompson, (1783) 1 Leach 291, the Court stated:
In Rex v. Thompson . . . a declaration to a suspected person that unless he gave
more satisfactory account of his connection with a stolen bank note his
interrogator would take him before a magistrate, was held equivalent to stating
that it would be better to confess, and to have operated to lead the prisoner to
believe that he would not be taken before a magistrate if he confessed.
Id. at 551–52.
121
Id. at 565.
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Bram’s statements were involuntary, because they were induced by a promise of
benefits.122 Based on the rulings in Hallinger and Bram, one can deduce that, had a
plea bargaining case risen to the Supreme Court in the late 1800s, the Court would
have clearly opposed the idea, just as so many state appellate courts did in the postCivil War period.123
In 1878, the Supreme Court took up a series of cases termed the Whiskey
Cases.124 The Court’s ruling in the Whiskey Cases dealt more with prosecutorial
authority to offer deals than with the involuntary nature of an induced confession,
but the cases offer confirmation of the Supreme Court’s antagonist view of
bargained justice at a time when plea bargaining was just beginning its rise in the
American criminal justice system.125 The Whiskey Cases involved prosecutions for
violations of internal revenue laws regarding liquor sales.126 Perhaps in an effort to
reward cooperation or clear a number of matters from his desk at one time, the
prosecutor offered the defendants a deal in return for pleading guilty.
[The parties] entered into an agreement by which it was, among other
things, agreed that if the said defendants would testify on behalf of the
plaintiffs frankly and truthfully . . . , and should plead guilty to one count
in an indictment . . . , and should withdraw their pleas in a certain
condemnation case then pending against them . . . , no new proceedings
should be commenced against said defendants on account of transactions
then past.127
At the time, it was not uncommon for defendants to receive immunity from the
governor in return for testifying against an accomplice. 128 The bargain here,
however, went further in that the agreement did not emanate from the governor but
directly from the prosecutor. 129 Further, the agreement did not merely offer
immunity in return for cooperation, but also required the defendants to plead guilty
to a single charge of the indictment in return for the other two charges being
dropped.130 Regarding this effort by the prosecution to induce the defendants to
122

Id.
See supra notes 64–70 and accompanying text (discussing the rise of plea
bargaining in the post-Civil War period).
124
See Whisky Cases, 99 U.S. 594 (1878).
125
See supra notes 121–128 and accompanying text; see also Sanders v. State, 85 Ind.
318, 333 (1882) (holding that a guilty plea must be voluntary, and finding that where a
defendant pleaded guilty for fear of mob violence, the plea was not voluntary).
126
See Whisky Cases, 99 U.S. at 594–95.
127
Id.
128
See Alschuler, supra note 65, at 15 (“[W]hen defendants were induced to testify
against their accomplices, Anglo-American courts refused to convict them on the basis of
their bargained confessions. The courts instead insisted that these defendants be given what
modern lawyers would call transactional immunity.”).
129
See Whisky Cases, 99 U.S. at 598.
130
See id.
123

2012]

PLEA BARGAINING’S INNOCENCE PROBLEM

69

plead guilty, the Supreme Court stated, “[T]he district attorney had no authority to
make the agreement alleged in the plea in bar,” and, as such, the bargain was
unenforceable. 131 While the Whiskey Cases decision did not refer to the
defendants’ guilty pleas as “involuntary,” the Court’s concern over this perception
likely influenced its decision to prohibit such deal making.
As the Rex, Hallinger, Bram and Whiskey cases demonstrate, plea-bargaining
was impermissible in the eyes of the Supreme Court during the late nineteenth
century.132
However, while the Supreme Court and various state courts were succinctly
rejecting attempts by prosecutors to offer inducements to defendants in return for
guilty pleas, plea-bargaining continued to be utilized in the trenches.133 It is not
surprising that more cases did not reach the Supreme Court to challenge this
growing phenomenon because defendants who were satisfied with their bargain
had no reason to appeal their convictions.134 Gradually, however, appellate cases
began appearing in the federal system and, by the early twentieth century, the
Court was once again addressing this ever-growing phenomenon.
In 1927, the Supreme Court was tasked with addressing the constitutionality
of prosecutors offering incentives for defendants to plead guilty in the case of
Kercheval v. United States.135 Kercheval pleaded guilty to a charge of using the
mail to defraud and was sentenced to three years in prison.136 According to the
defendant, he was induced to plead guilty because the prosecutor promised to
131
132

Id. at 606.
One legal annotation from the period summarized the law as follows:

We would conclude, from an examination of all the cases upon the subject, that
where there is an inducement of any kind held out to the prisoner, by reason of
which he enters the plea of guilty, it will . . . better comport with a sound
judicial discretion to allow the plea to be withdrawn . . . , and especially so when
counsel and friends represent to the accused that it has been the custom and
practice of the court to assess a punishment less than the maximum upon such a
plea . . . .
Alschuler, supra note 65, at 24 (quoting Hopkins, Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty, 11 CRIM.
L. MAG. 479, 484 (1889)).
133
See supra notes 97–135 and accompanying text.
134
In 1968, the American Bar Association released a report that included discussion
of the shadowy nature of plea bargaining up to that point in the American criminal system.
ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 77, at vii (“The subject
of this report—pleas of guilty, including the related matter of plea negotiations—was given
a high priority by the Special Committee. One of the purposes of the Project was to turn a
spotlight on what have been called ‘low visibility’ areas in the criminal process, those not
likely to be scrutinized by the appellate courts and to be discussed in widely-printed
opinions. This is such an area, and its importance is indicated by the fact that the great
majority of all convictions are the result of pleas of guilty.”).
135
Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 221 (1927).
136
Id.
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recommend a sentence of three months in jail.137 After being sentenced to three
years in prison, Kercheval filed a petition seeking to enforce the prosecutor’s
promise.138 The court declined, but did allow him to withdraw his guilty plea.139 At
trial, however, the court permitted the prosecution to introduce the prior guilty plea
as evidence against the defendant. 140 As might be expected, Kercheval was
convicted and once again sentenced to three years in prison.141
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Justices concluded that Kercheval’s
withdrawn guilty plea was inadmissible.142 More importantly, however, the Court
commented on the plea bargain between the government and the defendant.143
A plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere admission or
an extrajudicial confession; it is itself a conviction. Like a verdict of a
jury it is conclusive. More is not required; the court has nothing to do but
give judgment and sentence. Out of just consideration for persons
accused of crime, courts are careful that a plea of guilty shall not be
accepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with full
understanding of the consequences. . . . But, on timely application, the
court will vacate a plea of guilty shown to have been unfairly obtained or
given through ignorance, fear or inadvertence.144
Rather than positing that prosecutors are afforded more leeway to bargain for
guilty pleas than might be permitted in the context of confessions to police
officers, the Court indicated that even greater care should be taken to ensure guilty
pleas are voluntary.145 Once again, the Court reiterated the long-standing principle
that guilty pleas must be voluntary and may not be induced by “ignorance, fear or
inadvertence.”146
As the criminal dockets swelled during the early twentieth century and
prosecutors began to offer plea bargains in greater numbers, the Supreme Court
remained on the sidelines. It was not until 1941 that the Court again addressed the
issue of bargained justice, this time in its most direct manner yet.147 In 1936, Jack
Walker pleaded guilty to an indictment charging him with armed robbery of a
137

Id. During the negotiations, the prosecutor also asserted that the court would
impose the recommended sentence. Id.
138
See id.
139
Id. (“After hearing evidence on the issue, the court declined so to change the
sentence, but on petitioner’s motion, set aside the judgment and allowed him to withdraw
his plea of guilty and to plead not guilty.”).
140
Id. at 221–22.
141
Id. at 222.
142
See id. at 223, 225.
143
See id. at 223–24.
144
Id.
145
See id.
146
Id.
147
See Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941).
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national bank.148 After being sentenced to twelve years in prison, Walker filed a
writ of habeas corpus.149 In his writ, he alleged that he had been induced to plead
guilty by promises of leniency and threats of harsher sanctions for a failure to
cooperate.150 According to the Court:
[The District Attorney] told him to plead guilty, warning him that he
would be sentenced to twice as great a term if he did not so plead . . . . In
view of the District Attorney’s warning, and in fear of a heavy prison
term, he told the District Attorney he would plead guilty.151
While these arrangements seem common by today’s standards, the Supreme Court
found the prosecutor’s actions to be improper in 1941.152 The Court concluded that
prosecutor’s threats had resulted in Walker involuntarily pleading guilty, a clear
violation of the standard established in earlier precedent regarding voluntariness,
confession, and pleas of guilt.153 The Court remarked:
[Walker] was deceived and coerced into pleading guilty when his real
desire was to plead not guilty or at least to be advised by counsel as to
his course. If he did not voluntarily waive his right to counsel, or if he
was deceived or coerced by the prosecutor into entering a guilty plea, he
was deprived of a constitutional right.154
As a result, the Supreme Court remanded the case for a hearing regarding Walker’s
allegations.155 While the language of Walker should have given prosecutors pause
before continuing to offer defendants plea bargains, the rising tide of pleabargaining and the courts’ growing reliance on such swift justice was likely
already unstoppable.
A year later, the Supreme Court again addressed the standards applicable to
guilty pleas. In Waley v. Johnston,156 the Supreme Court examined allegations that
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents had physically threatened a defendant
and had threatened to “publish false statements and manufacture false evidence
that the kidnaped person had been injured, and by such publications and false
evidence to incite the public and to cause the State of Washington to hang the
petitioner . . . .”157 According to Waley, the government’s threats that he would be
148

Id. at 279.
Id.
150
Id. at 280–81.
151
Id. at 280.
152
See id. at 286–87.
153
See id. at 286; see also Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314, 324 (1892) (requiring
that the defendant voluntarily avail himself of the option to plead guilty).
154
Walker, 312 U.S. at 286.
155
Id. at 287.
156
Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
157
Id. at 102.
149

UTAH LAW REVIEW

72

[NO. 1

thrown out a window and beaten were unpersuasive.158 However, the threats that
false evidence would be offered to increase his punishment to death were
compelling and induced him to plead guilty as demanded.159
In ordering the lower court to conduct a hearing regarding Waley’s writ of
habeas corpus, the Supreme Court concluded that while the allegations may “tax
credulity,” they certainly called for further inquiry.160 In describing the applicable
considerations during the lower court hearing, the Supreme Court reiterated the
requirement that guilty pleas be entered voluntarily. 161 According to the Court,
“[i]f the allegations are found to be true, petitioner’s constitutional rights were
infringed. For a conviction on a plea of guilty coerced by a federal law
enforcement officer is no more consistent with due process than a conviction
supported by a coerced confession.”162 As late as 1940, therefore, the voluntariness
standard as applied uniformly to guilty pleas and confessions remained the same
and coercive tactics and incentives rendered any such admissions
unconstitutional.163
In 1958, the issue of plea bargaining again reached the Supreme Court, but,
on this occasion, the case was never decided for fear the result would throw the
entire American criminal justice system into chaos.164 The case for consideration
was that of Paul Shelton, who, despite consistently maintaining his innocence,
pleaded guilty to one count of interstate transportation of stolen vehicles after
being promised leniency.165 The prosecution had induced Shelton to confess his
guilt by promising a sentence of no more than one year and dismissal of all other
pending charges. 166 Though these promises sound similar to those made to Lea
158

See id. (“The petitioner stated generally that threats of . . . agents to throw
petitioner out of a window and ‘beat [him] up’ ‘didn’t bother [him].’”).
159
Id. (“But [the petition] specifically alleged that petitioner’s plea of guilty had been
induced by the threats of a named [FBI] agent to publish false statements and manufacture
false evidence that the kidnaped person had been injured . . . .”).
160
See id. at 104.
161
See id.
162
Id.
163
See id.
164
See Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1957), judgment set aside, 246
F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev’d per curiam on confession of error, 356 U.S. 26
(1958).
165
Shelton, 242 F.2d at 102.
166
Id. at 102 & n.1. According to the opinion, Shelton was induced to plead guilty
based on the following promises:
(1) government counsel’s promise to arrange for dismissal of all other federal
charges, (2) government’s counsel’s ‘guarantee’ of a sentence of not more than
one year in the instant case, (3) government’s counsel’s threat that it would take
defendant longer to get tried on the other pending charges than it would take
him to serve a one year sentence, and (4) defendant’s confused, anxious,
desperate, and incompetent state of mind resulting from prolonged confinement
in county jails while awaiting trial as aforesaid.
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Fastow in 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded
that Shelton’s plea must be vacated because the prosecutor’s promises of leniency
likely meant the plea was not entered “voluntarily.”167
There is no doubt, indeed it is practically conceded, that the appellant
pleaded guilty in reliance on the promise of the Assistant United States
Attorney that he would receive a sentence of only one year. The court,
before accepting the plea, did not ascertain that it was in truth and in fact
a voluntary plea not induced by such promise. It necessarily follows that
the judgment of conviction must be set aside and the plea of guilty
vacated.168
In the opinion of the judges on the Fifth Circuit in 1957: “Justice and liberty are
not the subjects of bargaining and barter.”169
Interestingly, the panel decision from the Fifth Circuit was later overturned en
banc, and the case proceeded to the Supreme Court.170 The Court never addressed
the challenge to plea-bargaining, however, because the government filed an
admission that the guilty plea may have been improperly obtained and the case was
remanded to the District Court without further discussion. 171 According to
Professor Albert Alschuler, evidence indicates that the government likely
confessed its error for fear that the Supreme Court would finally make a direct
ruling that all manner of plea bargaining was wholly unconstitutional.172
By 1963, when the Supreme Court ruled in the Lynumn case that her
confession was involuntarily coerced due to threats regarding her children and her
potential prison sentence, one other significant plea bargaining case had come
before the Court.173 In 1962, the court considered whether it was appropriate for a

Id.
167

See id. at 113 (“If a plea of guilty is made upon any understanding or agreement as
to the punishment to be recommended, it is essential, we think, that, before accepting such
plea, the district court should make certain that the plea is in fact made voluntarily.”).
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 573 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc).
171
See Shelton v. United States, 356 U.S. 26, 26 (1958) (“The motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for writ of certiorari are granted. Upon
consideration of the entire record and confession of error by the Solicitor General that the
plea of guilty may have been improperly obtained, the judgment of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court
for further proceedings.”).
172
Alschuler, supra note 65, at 37 (“In 1958, the Solicitor General (or perhaps some
other official in the Justice Department) may have assessed the probable votes of individual
Supreme Court Justices, may have sensed a substantial likelihood that the Court would
hold the practice of plea bargaining unlawful, and may have sought to foreclose this ruling
through a confession of error on narrow and disingenuous grounds.”).
173
See Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
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United States Attorney to promise a defendant that in return for pleading guilty his
sentence would be no more than twenty years in prison.174 In the alternative, the
prosecutor stated that if the defendant did not cooperate, “certain unsettled matters
concerning two other robberies would be added to the petitioner’s difficulties.”175
The Supreme Court remanded the Machibroda case for further fact finding, but
concluded that if the allegations were true, the petitioner was “clearly entitled to
relief.”176
There can be no doubt that, if the allegations contained in the petitioner’s
motion and affidavit are true, he is entitled to have his sentence vacated.
A guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which deprive it of the
character of a voluntary act, is void. . . . Like a verdict of a jury [a plea
of guilty] is conclusive. . . . Out of just consideration for persons accused
of crime, courts are careful that a plea of guilty shall not be accepted
unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with full understanding
of the consequences.177
With such strong language regarding the requirement that plea bargains be
voluntary and the historical context that guilty pleas and confessions were treated
in the same manner, it is little surprise that a year later the Supreme Court struck
down Beatrice Lynumn’s confession as a statement made after threats of
punishment and promises of leniency.178
In 1968, the Supreme Court once again struck a blow to plea-bargaining,
though this did not stop the acceleration of its growth. In United States v.
Jackson, 179 the Court examined a federal statute that differentiated between the
punishment available to those who pleaded guilty and those who put the
government to its burden.180 The law, 18 U.S.C. section 1201(a), reads as follows:
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate . . . commerce, any person
who had been unlawfully . . . kidnaped and held for ransom . . . or
otherwise . . . shall be punished (1) by death if the kidnapped person has
not been liberated unharmed, and if the verdict of the jury shall so
recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any term of years or for life, if
the death penalty is not imposed.181
As illustrated in the statute’s text above, the death penalty was only available
where a jury convicted the defendant and recommended capital punishment.
174

Id. at 489–90.
Id.
176
Id. at 493, 496.
177
Id. at 493 (internal quotation marks omitted).
178
See Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 537–38 (1963).
179
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
180
Id. at 570–72.
181
Id. at 570–71.
175
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Where the defendant pleaded guilty, however, the judge was limited to imposing a
sentence of life in prison.182 In October 1966, a federal grand jury in Connecticut
charged Charles Jackson and two others with a kidnapping that resulted in an
injury to the victim.183 The District Court, however, struck the indictment because
it found that the statute unconstitutionally made the “risk of death” the “price for
asserting the right to jury trial.”184
On appeal to the Supreme Court, a majority of the Justices agreed that the
statute imposed an “impermissible burden upon the exercise of a constitutional
right.”185
It is no answer . . . that federal trial judges may be relied upon to reject
coerced pleas of guilty and involuntary waivers of jury trials. For the evil
in the federal statute is not that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and
jury waivers but simply that it needlessly encourages them. A procedure
need not be inherently coercive in order that it be held to impose an
impermissible burden upon the assertion of a constitutional right. Thus
the fact that the [statute] tends to discourage defendants from insisting
upon their innocence and demanding trial by jury hardly implies that
every defendant who enters a guilty plea to a charge under the [statute]
does so involuntarily. The power to reject coerced guilty pleas and
involuntary jury waivers might alleviate, but it cannot totally eliminate,
the constitutional infirmity in the capital punishment provision of the
[statute].186
This is perhaps one of the most significant statements ever made about pleabargaining by the Supreme Court. According to the Court, and consistent with
earlier precedent, voluntary guilty pleas are permissible.187 In fact, the Court states
that the power of the lower court’s to accept a guilty plea is traditional and
“necessary for the . . . practical . . . administration of the criminal law.”188 The
Court offers as an example of a voluntary plea motivated by constitutional
considerations the case where an individual pleads guilty to “spare themselves and
their families the spectacle and expense of protracted courtroom proceedings.”189
The Court implies, however, that guilty pleas induced by coercive threats of
punishment or offers of leniency are unconstitutional.190 With regard to the federal
kidnapping statute, the threat of death only for those who refuse to confess their
182

See id.
Id. at 571 & n.1.
184
Id. at 571.
185
Id. at 572. The Court, however, disagreed that the statute as a whole was
unconstitutional and, instead, severed the provision from the remainder of the statute. Id.
186
Id. at 583.
187
Id. at 584–85.
188
Id.
189
Id. at 584.
190
See id. at 583.
183
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guilt is an example of a coercive incentive that makes any resulting guilty plea
invalid.191
In a dissenting opinion, Justice White argued that the kidnapping statute
should not be held unconstitutional.192 Relying on the majority’s conclusion that
“not every plea of guilty or waiver of the jury trial would be influenced by the
power of the jury to impose the death penalty,” Justice White stated that trial
courts need only carefully examine a defendant’s guilty plea.193 In so doing, the
lower court can make an individual determination “to make sure that they have
been neither coerced nor encouraged by the death penalty power in the jury.”194
For the majority, however, there was no legitimate justification for the imposition
of death upon only those who seek a trial and, therefore, while Justice White’s
approach may be appropriate in most cases, it was not sufficient to correct the
unconstitutional construction of this particular statute.195
By 1968, the Supreme Court had struck down every guilty plea induced by
threats of punishment or promises of leniency that had arrived on its docket.196 The
necessity of the plea bargaining machine, however, had never been greater. As the
implementation of the procedural rights given to defendants during the Due
Process Revolution slowed trial proceedings and criminal dockets continued to
swell, 197 prosecutors had no choice but to continue to utilize a constitutionally
questionable system. Finally, in 1970, the Supreme Court directly addressed the
issue of plea-bargaining’s constitutionality, but the result was stunning in that it
was inconsistent with over a century of precedent and the Court’s prior animosity
towards bargained justice.

191

Id.
Id. at 592 (White, J., dissenting).
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
See id. at 583. Following Jackson, the Supreme Court ruled in the 1969 case of
McCarthy v. United States that federal courts must personally address the defendant to
satisfy the requirements of Rule 11. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 463–64
(1969). Interestingly, in McCarthy, one sees that even in the late 1960s, prosecutors were
weary of creating plea agreements that contained direct promises of leniency. See id. at
461–62. In McCarthy, the defendant agreed to plead guilty to one charge of tax evasion. Id.
at 461. After the guilty plea was accepted, the prosecutor moved to dismiss two other
pending tax charges. Id. at 461. In so doing, the prosecutor made clear to the court that the
dismissal was primarily motivated by the defendant’s agreement to pay all taxes, penalties,
and interest with regard to any remaining tax burden. See id. at 461–62. In fact, the
prosecutor went on to insist that the judge ask the defendant if he had been induced by any
threats or promises. Id. at 461. The defendant stated that he had not and, therefore, the
lower court concluded the plea was voluntary. See id.; see also Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 242–43 (1969) (ruling that Rule 11 requirements also apply to state court
proceedings and stating that “[i]gnorance, incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducement,
subtle or blatant threats might be a perfect cover-up of unconstitutionality”).
196
See supra notes 115–199 and accompanying text.
197
See infra notes 230–233 and accompanying text.
192
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B. The Supreme Court’s Great Compromise of 1970
In 1970, a case came before the Supreme Court that would help usher in the
final stages of plea-bargaining’s triumph. In 1959, Robert Brady was charged with
kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a), the same criminal statute that had
been at issue in the Jackson case in 1968.198 As previously discussed, the statute
allowed for the death penalty only when recommended by a jury.199 As a result, a
defendant who pleaded guilty and avoided a jury trial could successfully avoid the
death penalty in favor of the alternative maximum sentence of life in prison.200 The
victim in the Brady case had not been liberated unharmed and, therefore, Brady
was subject to the death penalty provision if recommended by a jury.201 At first,
Brady pleaded not guilty and intended to proceed to trial.202 Brady later learned
that his co-defendant had agreed to plead guilty and intended to testify against him
at trial.203 As such, Brady changed his plea to guilty and was sentenced to fifty
years in prison.204 Brady later sought relief from the Supreme Court, claiming that
his plea was involuntary because the statute coerced him into avoiding a jury trial
to ensure that he would not be sentenced to death.205 In examining Brady’s claim,
the lower court concluded, “no representations [were] made with respect to a
reduced sentence or clemency.” 206 Thus, the lower court held the guilty plea
voluntary.207
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that guilty pleas must be
voluntary and intelligent, a determination that must be conducted based on the
facts of the case. 208 The first question examined by the Court, therefore, was
whether Brady’s plea was involuntary because he faced a more severe sentence if
found guilty after trial. 209 The Court concluded that just because the enhanced
penalty led to Brady’s decision, it does not follow that the plea was necessarily
involuntary.210 Rather, Brady’s decision was similar to one made by a defendant
who pleads guilty in the face of overwhelming evidence rather than subjecting his
198

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 743 (1970).
See id.
200
See id.
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
Id. at 743–44.
205
Id. at 744.
206
Id. at 745.
207
Id.
208
Id. at 748.
209
Id. at 749.
210
Id. at 749–50 (“But even if we assume that Brady would not have pleaded guilty
except for the death penalty provision of § 1201(a), this assumption merely identifies the
penalty provision as a “but for” cause of his plea. That the statute caused the plea in this
sense does not necessarily prove that the plea was coerced and invalid as an involuntary
act.”).
199
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or her family to the expense of trial. 211 The Court continued, however, with a
caveat regarding coercive tactics by the prosecution.
Of course, the agents of the State may not produce a plea by actual or
threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will of
the defendant. But nothing of the sort is claimed in this case; nor is there
evidence that Brady was so gripped by fear of the death penalty or hope
of leniency that he did not or could not, with the help of counsel,
rationally weigh the advantages of going to trial against the advantages
of pleading guilty.212
According to the Court, where the defendant pleads guilty in return for the
“certainty or probability of a lesser penalty [as contained in the statute] rather than
face the wider range of possibilities extending from acquittal to conviction and a
higher penalty authorized by law for the crime charged,” the plea is voluntary and
constitutionally sound. 213 The Court concluded that a guilty plea to avoid a
possible death penalty under the applicable statute is valid.214
Based on its statements that a defendant may plead guilty in return for the
promise or possibility of a reduced sentence, the Supreme Court appears to have
adopted language crafted by Judge Tuttle of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit to describe the applicable test for “voluntariness” moving
forward.215
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences,
including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court,
prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or
promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation
(including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises

211

Id. at 750 (“The State to some degree encourages pleas of guilty at every important
step in the criminal process. For some people, their breach of a State’s law is alone
sufficient reason for surrendering themselves and accepting punishment. For others,
apprehension and charge, both threatening acts by the Government, jar them into admitting
their guilt. In still other cases, the post-indictment accumulation of evidence may convince
the defendant and his counsel that a trial is not worth the agony and expense to the
defendant and his family. All these pleas of guilty are valid in spite of the State’s
responsibility for some of the factors motivating the pleas . . . .”).
212
Id. at 750.
213
Id. at 751.
214
Id. at 755.
215
Id. at 755. The Court attempts to explain the apparent inconsistency between its
decision in Brady and the prior precedent of Bram. According to the Court, the decision in
Bram is distinguishable because there was no counsel present, the threats and promises
were made face-to-face, and there was a hazard of an impulsive and improvident response
to a seeming but unreal advantage. Id. at 754–55.
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that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the
prosecutor’s business (e.g. bribes).216
By the end of 1970, therefore, confession law and the law of guilty pleas had
diverged significantly. No longer was any promise of leniency thought to corrupt a
guilty plea as the Court had ruled throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Though the plea must still be “voluntary,” the term had shifted to mean
merely that the plea could not be induced “by actual or threatened physical harm or
by mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant.”217 A dramatic shift had
occurred in the law, and, although there was still an upper limit beyond which
inducements to plead guilty could not venture, that limit was much higher than it
had been just a few short years before.218 Plea-bargaining, it seemed, had finally
established itself as an unseverable part of the American criminal justice system.
It is clear that the Supreme Court radically departed from its previous
decisions to craft its decision in Brady, but it is unclear why the Court felt it
necessary to make such a significant departure from past precedent. The answer, it
appears, has much to do with plea-bargaining’s rise to dominance by 1970 and the
realities of an overburdened criminal justice system.
Despite the hostility expressed towards bargained justice by the Supreme
Court prior to the Brady decision in 1970, the plea-bargaining machine continued
to evolve and to increase in influence. Early records indicate that in the first half of
the nineteenth century only 10 to 15 percent of cases resulted in a guilty plea.219
While plea-bargaining may have occurred in certain of these cases, it is likely
many were merely cases in which the defendant did not wish to endure trial when
the evidence appeared overwhelming, such as occurred in the Hallinger case in
1892.220 Shortly thereafter, however, the rate of convictions by guilty plea began
an upward climb.221 By 1908, 50 percent of federal criminal cases resulted in pleas
216

Id. at 755. Interestingly, this test appears to be plucked from the en banc decision
in Shelton v. United States, the case the solicitor general removed from the Supreme
Court’s jurisdiction by offering a confession of error for fear the Supreme Court as
composed in 1958 would strike plea bargaining as unconstitutional in its entirety. Shelton
v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev’d per curiam on
confession of error, 356 U.S. 26 (1958).
217
See Brady, 397 U.S. at 750–51; see also Becker, supra note 100, at 759
(“Although the Court agreed that guilty pleas were invalid if not ‘voluntary,’ its treatment
of voluntariness cut that concept loose from its moorings in the law.”).
218
See Brady, 397 U.S. at 757–58; see also Becker, supra note 100, at 759 (“In Brady
v. United States and its companion cases, however, the Court denied the relevance not
merely of some but all prior doctrine.”).
219
See Alschuler, supra note 65, at 10 (noting that Boston Police Court records from
1824 indicated that only 11 percent of defendants entered pleas of guilty); id. at 18 (noting
that in 1839, 15% of all defendants in Manhattan and Brooklyn pleaded guilty).
220
Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314 (1892).
221
See Alschuler, supra note 65, at 27 (“In the federal courts, the statistics date from
1908, when only about 50% of all convictions were by plea of guilty. This percentage
remained fairly constant until 1916, when it increased to 72%.”).
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of guilty, and by 1916 this number had increased to 72 percent.222 By 1960, the
decade just prior to the Brady decision, approximately 90 percent of cases in the
American criminal justice system were resolved through a guilty plea.223 Perhaps
the increase in guilty pleas reflected a growing desire by defendants to confess
their sins, but, more likely, it is a reflection of the growing dominance of pleabargaining throughout this period.
Given that 90 percent of all convictions by 1970 were the result of a guilty
plea, most acquired in return for some benefit from the prosecution, the Supreme
Court was tasked with a very difficult decision in Brady. If the Court continued
with the century-old line of cases regarding confession, plea-bargaining would
certainly have been found unconstitutional. The results of such a ruling, however,
would be to destroy the criminal justice system, a system that was already
struggling to dispose of its ever-growing docket even with 90 percent of cases
ending without a trial. 224 The shadowy rise of plea-bargaining during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries helped solidify its role in the criminal
justice system, because, by the time the Supreme Court came to address the issue
specifically, all court systems in the United States relied on bargained justice to
survive.225

222

Id.
Borteck, supra note 79, at 1439 n.43 (2004) (citing Corinna Barrett Lain, Accuracy
Where It Matters: Brady v. Maryland in the Plea Bargaining Context, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1,
1 (2002) (noting that since the 1960s the plea bargaining rate has been around 90 percent));
see also ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 77, at 1–2 (“The
plea of guilty is probably the most frequent method of conviction in all jurisdictions; in
some localities as many as 95 per cent of the criminal cases are disposed in of this way.”).
Today, pleas of guilty account for over 95 percent of all federal cases. See U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 44.
224
See F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma M. Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting
the Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 BYU J.
PUB. L. 189, 192 (2002) (noting that if plea-bargaining were not available, “the legal
system would crumble under the weight of the cases requiring juries and judges”); Thomas
R. McCoy & Michael J. Mirra, Plea Bargaining as Due Process in Determining Guilt, 32
STAN. L. REV. 887, 895 n.40 (1980) (citing John Kaplan, American Merchandising and the
Guilty Plea: Replacing the Bazaar with the Department Store, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 215, 220
(1977)) (stating that the costs of administering the criminal justice system in the 1970s
would have doubled if plea-bargaining had been reduced even from 90 percent to 80
percent of all cases).
225
The Court also likely realized that even if it explicitly ruled that plea-bargaining
was unconstitutional, the reluctance of prosecutors, defendants, and courts to observe the
Court’s earlier rejection of bargained justice meant that plea-bargaining would simply slip
back into the shadows as an unofficial means of dealing with the pressures of the system.
See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (“[A] rigid constitutional rule that
would prohibit a prosecutor from acting forthrightly in his dealings with the defense could
only invite unhealthy subterfuge that would drive the practice of plea bargaining back into
the shadows from which it has so recently emerged.”).
223
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As if the criminal justice system were not already bogged down with growing
caseloads, in part due to overcriminalization, the Supreme Court had just finished
handing defendants a number of significant victories during the due process
revolution of the 1960s 226 For instance, the Supreme Court imposed the
“exclusionary rule” for violations of the Fourth Amendment, granted the right to
counsel, and imposed the obligation that suspects be informed of their rights prior
to being interrogated. 227 The result was not only to increase the complexity of
criminal prosecutions, but also to increase the length of trials. In many
jurisdictions, the length of trial almost doubled from the early 1960s to the late
1960s. 228 According to one commentator, “A major effect of the ‘due process
revolution’ was to augment the pressures for plea negotiation. For one thing, the
Supreme Court’s decisions contributed to the growing backlog of criminal cases. . .
. In addition, the Court’s decisions probably contributed to the increased length of
the criminal trial.”229
The Supreme Court considered the necessity of plea-bargaining as a tool to
promote judicial economy in reaching its decision in Brady.230 The Court noted
that 90 to 95 percent of all convictions are the result of a guilty plea and that “with
the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved for
those cases in which there is a substantial issue of the defendant’s guilt.”231 The
Court also went on to cite an American Bar Association report on plea-bargaining
issued in 1968.232 The report stated, “It may be noted . . . that a high proportion of
plea of guilty and nolo contendere does benefit the system. Such pleas tend to limit
226

See generally Dripps, supra note 76, at 1156–61 (discussing the relationship
between broadening legal rules and plea-bargaining); Stuntz, supra note 76, at 519–20
(2001) (discussing the influence of broader laws on the rate of plea-bargaining).
227
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (self-incrimination); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(exclusionary rule).
228
See Alschuler, supra note 65, at 38 (“In the District of Columbia, the length of the
average felony trial grew from 1.9 days in 1950 to 2.8 days in 1965, and in Los Angeles the
length of the average felony jury trial increased from 3.5 days in 1964 to 7.2 days in
1968.”).
229
Id.
230
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970); see also Hessick and Saujani,
supra note 224, at 192 (noting that “efficiency is the overriding cause for entering plea
negotiations in general”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System,
12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 308–22 (1983).
231
Brady, 397 U.S. at 752 & n.10; see also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,
260 (1971) (“The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and
the accused, sometimes loosely called ‘plea bargaining,’ is an essential component of the
administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged.”).
232
Brady, 397 U.S. at 752 n.9 (citing ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, supra note 77, at 37–52); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363
(1978) (citing ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE , supra note 77, at 60–
69 in support of its conclusion that a recommendation of leniency is permitted as part of a
plea bargain).
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the trial process to deciding real disputes and, consequently, to reduce the need for
funds and personnel.”233
Faced with a daunting decision, the Supreme Court chose to make a great
compromise. Defendants had already been afforded significant additional rights
during the 1960’s due process revolution. Now the Court would permit defendants,
armed with their new rights, the ability to bargain for a more lenient sentence when
the government had significant evidence against them. At the same time, pleabargaining would provide courts with a mechanism for keeping up with their
growing case loads and allow them to continue dispensing justice in a timely
manner.
III. PLEA BARGAINING’S INNOCENCE PROBLEM
A. The Coercive Consequences of the Great Compromise
In the same year the Supreme Court decided Brady, it also handed down
another plea-bargaining decision that helped to solidify bargained justice as a
major facet of the American criminal justice system. In North Carolina v.
Alford,234 the Court stated that a defendant could plead guilty in return for some
benefit, such as a reduced sentence, while continuing to maintain his or her
innocence.235 The Court inserted a caveat, however, requiring the “record before
the judge contain[] strong evidence of actual guilt” to ensure the rights of the
innocent are protected and guilty pleas are the result of “free and intelligent
choice.”236
In 1977, Kerry Max Cook was arrested for the rape and murder of a woman in
Tyler, Texas.237 Though Cook was convicted by a jury and sentenced to death a
year later, he continued to profess his innocence.238 During his time on death row,
Cook was abused, raped, and attempted to commit suicide twice. 239 After one
suicide attempt, prison officials found a note that stated, “I really was an innocent
man.” 240 His initial conviction was eventually overturned and a second trial in
233

See ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 77, at 2.
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
235
Id. at 37; see also Andrew D. Leipond, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to
Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1156 (2005) (“An Alford plea, where
the defendant pleads guilty but simultaneously denies having committed the crime, clearly
puts the court on notice that this guilty plea is problematic . . . .”).
236
Alford, 400 U.S. at 37, 38 n.10; Leipond, supra note 235. Currently, the federal
system, the District of Columbia, and forty-seven states permit Alford pleas. See Stephanos
Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case
of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1372 n.52 (2003).
237
The Plea, FRONTLINE (June 17, 2004), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/shows/plea/four/cook.html.
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
Id.
234
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1992 resulted in a hung jury.241 The government retried Cook again, and the death
penalty was imposed by a jury a second time.242 In 1996, Cook’s conviction was
again overturned, this time due to police and prosecutorial misconduct dating back
to the initial investigation and trial of Cook in 1978. 243 Despite the numerous
setbacks, the government moved forward to retry Cook a fourth time.244 Due to the
prior misconduct, however, the prosecutor in the case would no longer be able to
use the testimony of a central witness in the case.245 As the trial for Cook’s life
approached, the prosecution conceded that the case was looking increasingly
weak.246
Having discussed the evolution of the plea-bargaining machine it will come as
no surprise that the prosecutor responded to the significant likelihood of losing a
trial by offering Cook a plea deal.247 In return for pleading guilty, Cook would
receive a sentence of time served and walk out of prison. 248 Cook refused,
however, continuing to profess his innocence.249
Kerry [Max Cook] looked [his attorney] in the eye and said, “I want to
be free, I want this behind me, but I will go back to death row, I will let
them strap me to the gurney and put the poison in my veins before I lie,
before I plead guilty.250
In response, the prosecutor offered Cook the same deal in return for an Alford
plea. 251 Cook could now plead guilty, while, at the same time, continuing to
maintain his innocence.252 Cook took the plea agreement and, twenty-two years
after being placed in prison, walked free. 253 Two months later, a DNA test
conclusively demonstrated that Cook was not a match to forensic evidence

241

Id.
Id.
243
Id. (The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals “wrote that the investigation was
intentionally misleading, the testimony of the key witness, Robert Hoehn, was prejudicial,
and the first conviction was obtained through fraud and in violation of the law.”).
244
Id.
245
Id. (“The irony was that the testimony of the witness, Robert Hoehn, who had died
in the meantime, was the example cited by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals as
prejudicial and contradictory.”).
246
See id.
247
Id.
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
Id.
251
Id.
252
Id.
253
Id.
242
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obtained at the scene of the crime in 1977.254 Though he had been induced to plead
guilty, Cook was, in fact, innocent.255
Today, over 95 percent of defendants in the criminal justice system plead
guilty and, in most cases, such confessions are prompted by offers of leniency or
other benefits from the prosecution.256 It is unclear how many of these defendants
are innocent, but it is clear that plea-bargaining has an innocence problem.257 At
254

Id.
Id. (“So, you know, was it worth it? Sometimes when I’m holding my son I can
say yes. Sometimes, when I’m by myself, I say no. They won.”). Cook is certainly not the
only innocent defendant coerced into pleading guilty by overpowering plea offers. A 1999
Los Angeles Times article describing newly discovered evidence in a police corruption
case discussed the case of two defendants who may have been framed by police. See
Samuel H. Pillsbury, Even the Innocent Can be Coerced Into Pleading Guilty, L.A. TIMES
(Nov. 28, 1999), http://articles.latimes.com/1999/nov/28/opinion/op-38287. According to
the article, though the new evidence indicated that both men were innocent, each had
previously pleaded guilty to the fabricated charges to avoid the risk of serving lengthy
prison sentences if convicted at trial. Id. (“Oscar Peralta (aka Jose Perez) pleaded guilty to
assault on a police officer in a shooting incident, although he believed that he was framed
in the case to cover up improper police conduct. Peralta admitted guilt to win a promised
sentence of time served—10 months in county jail—and avoid the life sentence he faced
had he been convicted at trial.”); see also Morris B. Hoffman, The Myth of Factual
Innocence, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 663, 672 (2007) (“Do innocent people plead guilty? Of
course. Innocent people sometimes even preempt their false guilty pleas by falsely
confessing, both with and without overbearing interrogation.”).
256
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 44, at fig.C (stating that in 2009, 96.3
percent of federal defendants pleaded guilty).
257
See Baldwin & McConville, supra note 64, at 296 (“[T]he results of our research
suggest that some defendants who perhaps were innocent, and a larger group who probably
would have been acquitted had the case gone to trial, were nonetheless induced to plead
guilty.”); Russell D. Covey, Signaling and Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 66
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 73, 74 (2009) (“Plea bargaining has an innocence problem.”);
Michael O. Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal
Courts, 89 HARV. L. REV. 293, 295 (1975) (“On the basis of the analysis that follows, I
conclude that the pressure on defendants to plead guilty in the federal courts has induced a
high rate of conviction by ‘consent’ in cases in which no conviction would have been
obtained if there had been a contest.”); Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals,
Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317,
1343–44 (1997) (arguing “that America’s criminal justice system creates a significant risk
that innocent people will be systematically convicted”); Leipond, supra note 235, at 1154
(“Yet we know that sometimes innocent people plead guilty . . . .”); Robert E. Scott &
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1949–51 (1992)
(discussing plea-bargaining’s innocence problem); David L Shapiro, Should a Guilty Plea
Have Preclusive Effect?, 70 IOWA L. REV. 27, 27 (1984) (discussing the opposition to
argument that plea bargain should “be preclusive against the person who entered the plea”);
see also Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295,
2295–96 (2006) (arguing a partial ban on plea-bargaining would assist in preventing
innocent defendants from being forced to plead guilty by forcing prosecutors to allocate
their limited resources towards only strong cases).
255
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least one study has concluded that as many as 27 percent of defendants who plead
guilty would not have been convicted at trial, though this estimate seems
exceptionally high. 258 Another more empirically driven study examined DNA
evidence in capital rape-murder cases and determined that between 3.3 and 5
percent of those convicted, either through trial or a guilty plea, were factually
innocent.259 Other studies have placed the number of defendants who plead guilty
as a result of inducements by the government but who are factually innocent
between 1.6 percent and 8 percent.260 Taking even the lowest of these estimates,
the reality is striking and means that in 2009 there were over 1,250 innocent
defendants forced to falsely admit guilt in the federal system alone.261 Extrapolated
out to the entire American criminal justice system since 1970, there are
258

See Shapiro, supra note 257, at 45; see also Finkelstein, supra note 257, at 309–10
(concluding that “at least one-third of all defendants pleading guilty in high-[pleabargaining] rate districts would ultimately have escaped conviction if they had refused to
consent”).
259
D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual
Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 778 (2007) (demonstrating
through analysis of DNA exonerations for capital rape-murders from 1982 to 1989 that the
minimum factually wrongful conviction rate was 3.3 percent); see also Brandon L. Garrett,
Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 74 (2008) (noting that nine of the first two
hundred individuals exonerated by the Innocence Project had pleaded guilty); Scott &
Stuntz, supra note 257, at 1948 n.134 (“[I]f acquittal is correlated (albeit not perfectly)
with innocence, and there is an unusually high percentage of acquittals in murder cases,
then there may be an unusually high number of innocent defendants on trial for murder.
Since risk aversion should lead many (perhaps most) innocent defendants to plead guilty,
even given a substantial acquittal rate, the pool of all murder defendants probably includes
an unusually high number of innocents.”).
260
See Baldwin & McConville, supra note 64, at 296–98 (discussing pleabargaining’s innocence problem in England); Givelber, supra note 257, at 1343–44
(estimating nearly 8 percent of all convictions would be false if “innocent people plead
guilty at as high a rate as innocent people are convicted following trial”); id. (“These
figures represent convictions of innocent people following trial. In this country at least, 90
percent of convictions are secured through guilty pleas. Here, the criminal justice system is
truly operating without a compass. If it is modestly assumed that, at the least, there are as
many total convictions of innocent defendants resulting from pleas as there are from trials,
one arrives, using the English study percentages, at a figure of 1.6 percent. This figure is a
slightly higher estimate than that of the criminal justice officials surveyed by Huff, Rattner
and Sagarin. If the more aggressive assumption is made that innocent people plead guilty at
as high a rate as innocent people are convicted following trial, then nearly 8% of all
convictions would be false.”); George C. Thomas III, Two Windows Into Innocence, 7
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 575, 577–78 (2010) (“McConville and Baldwin concluded that two
percent of the guilty pleas were of doubtful validity. As there were roughly two million
felony cases filed in 2006, if two percent result in conviction of an innocent defendant,
40,000 wrongful felony convictions occur per year.”).
261
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 44, at tbl.10 (stating that in 2009, there
were 81,372 defendants convicted in the federal system, of which 96.3 percent pleaded
guilty).
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conservatively tens of thousands of innocent persons who have been induced to
plead guilty by overpowering plea bargains. If this is the case, plea-bargaining
certainly has a significant and unacceptable innocence problem.
In 1991, John Dixon pleaded guilty to first degree kidnapping, first degree
robbery, two counts of first degree aggravated sexual assault, and unlawful
possession of a weapon in the third degree, and was sentenced to forty-five years
in prison.262 Dixon had not entered a guilty plea because he was remorseful for
something he had done.263 Dixon pleaded guilty because he was threatened with
the possibility of a higher sentence if he lost at trial and offered the promise of
leniency if he relieved the government of its burden at trial.264 In 2001, Dixon’s
conviction was vacated after DNA testing revealed that he could not have been the
assailant in the crime.265 A week later, after ten years in prison, he was released.266
Dixon reminds us of the real people behind the statistics and demonstrates that
with significant regularity defendants are being compelled to falsely plead guilty to
offenses they did not commit.267 The question remains, however, is there a remedy
to plea bargaining’s innocence problem or did, as some believe, the Supreme Court
grant prosecutors unlimited powers to bargain in Brady?

262

The Innocence Project - Know the Cases: Browse Profiles: John Dixon,
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/86.php (last visited Feb. 7,
2012) (describing the story of John Dixon, who pleaded guilty to rape charges for fear he
would receive a harsher sentence if he proceeded to trial, but was later exonerated by DNA
evidence).
263
Id.; see also Richard Klein, Due Process Denied: Judicial Coercion in the Plea
Bargaining Process, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1349, 1408 (2004) (“The defendant pleads guilty
to reduce his punishment; it’s a matter of expediency. Remorse has very little to do with it,
and judges, who, if anything, are more cynical then [sic] the rest of us, are fully aware of
that.”).
264
The Innocence Project - Know the Cases: Browse Profiles: John Dixon,
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/86.php (last visited Feb. 7,
2012); see also Klein, supra note 263, at 1398 (“By the time of the plea allocution it is
clear that the defendant has decided to take the plea bargain and knows or has been
instructed by counsel to tell the court that he did indeed do the crime. Predictably, the
National Institute of Justice survey found that judges rejected guilty pleas in only two
percent of cases. Since efficiency and speed is the name of the game, it is not unexpected
that meaningful questioning of the defendant does not occur and it is not surprising that the
Institute concluded that the plea allocution procedure is ‘close to being a new kind of pious
fraud.’”); Wright, supra note 76, at 93 (“But when it comes to the defendant's
‘voluntariness’— the second half of the formula—courts have walked away. The proper
knowledge, together with a pro forma statement from the defendant that her guilty plea was
not coerced, normally suffices.”).
265
The Innocence Project, supra note 264.
266
Id.
267
See id.; Leipold, supra note 235, at 1154 (“[S]ometimes the prosecutor offers such
a generous discount for admitting guilt that the defendant feels he simply can’t take the
chance of going to trial.”).
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B. The Constitutional Limits of the Great Compromise
and a Litmus Test for the Brady Safety-Valve
While the Brady decision signaled a shift away from wholesale rejection of
bargained justice, it contained an important limitation regarding how far the Court
would permit prosecutors to venture in attempting to induce defendants to plead
guilty. In the concluding paragraphs of the decision, the Supreme Court discussed
its vision for the utilization of plea-bargaining in the criminal system. 268 Pleabargaining was a tool for use only in cases where the evidence was overwhelming
and where the defendant, unlikely to succeed at trial, might benefit from the
opportunity to bargain for a reduced sentence.269 Plea-bargaining, however, was
not to be used to overwhelm defendants into pleading guilty where their guilt was
in question.270
For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of
pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious—his
exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can begin immediately,
and the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the State there are
also advantages—the more promptly imposed punishment after an
admission of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of
punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and
prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in which there is a
substantial issue of the defendant’s guilt or in which there is substantial
doubt that the State can sustain its burden of proof.271
According to the Court, if the government were to begin offering significant
incentives to defendants whose guilt was uncertain in an effort to motivate them to
plead guilty, defendants who might in fact be innocent, the Court would be forced
to reconsider its approval of the plea-bargaining system.272
This is not to say that guilty plea convictions hold no hazards for the
innocent or that the methods of taking guilty pleas presently employed in
this country are necessarily valid in all respects. This mode of conviction
is no more foolproof than full trials to the court or to the jury.
Accordingly, we take great precautions against unsound results, and we
should continue to do so, whether conviction is by plea or by trial. We
would have serious doubts about this case if the encouragement of guilty
pleas by offers of leniency substantially increased the likelihood that

268

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756–58 (1970).
See id. at 752.
270
See id. at 750, 752.
271
Id. at 752 (emphasis added).
272
See id. at 757–58.
269
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defendants, advised by competent counsel, would falsely condemn
themselves.273
While the Supreme Court was willing to permit a compromise in the interests of
justice and judicial economy in 1970, it also created a safety-valve. 274 Safetyvalves are intended to relieve pressure when forces within a machine become too
great and, thereby, preserve the integrity of the machine.275 The Brady safety-valve
serves just such a purpose by placing a limit on the amount of pressure that can
constitutionally be placed on defendants to plead guilty. According to the Court,
however, should plea-bargaining become so common that prosecutors offer deals
to all defendants, including those whose guilt is in question, and the incentives to
bargain become so overpowering that even innocent defendants acquiesce, then the
Brady safety-valve will have failed and the plea-bargaining machine will have
ventured into the realm of unconstitutionality.276
Interestingly, the Brady decision is not the only Supreme Court case from the
1970’s that discusses the Court’s concerns regarding innocent defendants and that
makes mention of a safety-valve or threshold regarding acceptable incentives to
bargain.277 In Alford, the Court stated that Alford plea agreements must only be
273

Id. The sentiment that innocent defendants should not be encouraged to plead
guilty has been echoed by academics. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 236, at 1382 (“Even if
innocent defendants want to plead guilty, the law should not go out of its way to promote
these unjust results.”); Leipold, supra note 235, at 1158 (supporting the statements of
Stephanos Bibas regarding innocent defendants and plea bargaining).
274
See Brady, 397 U.S. at 757–58.
275
Safety Valve, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
safety%20valve (last visited Feb. 7, 2012) (defining safety valve as “an automatic escape
or relief valve,” “an outlet for pent-up energy or emotion,” or “something that relieves the
pressure of overcrowding”).
276
See Brady, 397 U.S. at 757–58.
277
See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363–65 (1978) (discussing plea
bargains and noting there are “undoubtedly constitutional limits” to the exercise of plea
bargaining); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37–39 (1970) (holding as valid a guilty
plea made to avoid the death penalty and discussing when a court should accept guilty
pleas”). Even the 1968 ABA report regarding plea-bargaining accepted the premise that
plea-bargaining should be for defendants whose guilt is demonstrated by overwhelming
evidence, thus freeing resources for the trial of those defendants whose guilty is less
certain.
[A] high proportion of pleas of guilty and nolo contendere does benefit the
system. Such pleas tend to limit the trial process to deciding real disputes and,
consequently, to reduce the need for funds and personnel. If the number of
judges, courtrooms, court personnel and counsel for prosecution and defense
were to be increased substantially [if necessitated by a decreased use of plea
bargains], the funds necessary for such increases might be diverted from
elsewhere in the criminal justice process. Moreover, the limited use of the trial
process for those cases in which the defendant has grounds for contesting the
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utilized in cases where the evidence regarding actual guilt is strong and sufficient
to negate the defendant’s claim of innocence.278 Where there is doubt as to the
defendant’s culpability, the case must be sent to trial and no plea bargain may be
struck so as to protect the “innocent and. . . . insur[e] that guilty pleas are a product
of free and intelligent choice.”279 Unfortunately, despite this clear standard from
the Supreme Court, Kerry Max Cook’s false confession of guilt was accepted even
though the offer itself signaled the prosecution’s belief that it would lose at trial.280
In 1978, the Supreme Court addressed plea-bargaining once more in
Bordenkircher v. Hayes,281 and, once again, expressed concern regarding innocent
defendants. Paul Hayes was indicted on a charge of uttering a forged instrument,
an offense under Kentucky law punishable by two to ten years in prison.282 During
plea negotiations, the prosecution stated that if Hayes pleaded guilty, he would
recommend a sentence of five years. 283 If he did not “save the court the
inconvenience and necessity of a trial,” however, the prosecution threatened to reindict Hayes under a habitual offender law that carried a life sentence.284 Hayes
refused to plead guilty and, as a result, was re-indicted, found guilty at trial, and
sentenced to life in prison.285
In holding that the prosecutor in the Bordenkircher case had not acted
inappropriately, the Supreme Court began by clearly stating that “[t]o punish a
person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process
violation of the most basic sort.”286 The Court continued, however, “in the ‘giveand-take’ of plea bargaining, there is no such element of punishment or retaliation
so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution’s offer.”287 As long
matter of guilt aids in preserving the meaningfulness of the presumption of
innocence.
ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL Justice, supra note 77, at 2.
278
See Alford, 400 U.S. at 37–38.
279
Id. at 38 n.10; see also Bibas, supra note 236, at 1382 (“It should go without
saying that it is wrong to convict innocent defendants. Thus, the law should hinder these
convictions instead of facilitating them through Alford and nolo contendere pleas.”).
280
See infra notes 237–255 and accompanying text (discussing the Kerry Max Cook
case).
281
Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. 357.
282
Id. at 358.
283
Id.
284
Id. at 358–59.
285
Id. at 359.
286
Id. at 363.
287
Id.; see also Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 225 (1978) (“Finally, we are
unconvinced that the New Jersey statutory pattern exerts such a powerful influence to
coerce inaccurate pleas non vult that it should be deemed constitutionally suspect. There is
no suggestion here that Corbitt was not well counseled or that he misunderstood the
choices that were placed before him. Here, as in Bordenkircher, the State did not trespass
on the defendant’s rights ‘so long as the accused [was] free to accept or reject’ the choice
presented to him by the State that is, to go to trial and face the risk of life imprisonment or
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as the incentives to bargain are sufficiently reasonable and the defendant retains
this sense of freedom, the Court determined that it is unlikely an innocent
defendant would be “driven to false self-condemnation.”288 Of course, the Supreme
Court was wrong regarding its estimation of the impact of prosecutors’ offers on
innocent defendants. As John Dixon demonstrates, it is very likely that innocent
defendants will plead guilty in return for the incredible incentives currently being
offered by the prosecution, incentives that strip away a defendant’s ability to freely
decide whether to accept or reject the government’s advances.289
While the Supreme Court in Brady, Alford, and Bordenkircher noted that plea
bargains were only intended for cases with strong evidentiary support and not as a
tool to induce all defendants, including the innocent, to plead guilty, modern day
plea-bargaining is clearly at odds with this central edict of the Supreme Court’s
great compromise of 1970. 290 Today, defendants whose guilt is uncertain are
offered plea bargains as often, if not more often, than those for whom the evidence
is particularly strong.291 Not only are these defendants of questionable guilt offered
to seek acceptance of a non vult plea and the imposition of the lesser penalty authorized by
law.”).
288
Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 (“Indeed, acceptance of the basic legitimacy of
plea bargaining necessarily implies rejection of any notion that a guilty plea is involuntary
in a constitutional sense simply because it is the end result of the bargaining process.”).
289
See supra notes 262–267 and accompanying text (discussing the John Dixon case).
290
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J.
1969, 1969 (1992) (“Persons at risk of unjust conviction may prefer a certain (but low)
punishment in a plea bargain to the risk of conviction and high punishment after trial.”);
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1979 (1992)
(“[P]lea bargaining seriously impairs the public interest in effective punishment of crime
and in accurate separation of the guilty from the innocent.”). Interestingly, in a 1980 article,
Thomas R. McCoy and Michael J. Mirra argued that “plea bargaining is constitutionally
defensible . . . . [but] demands the development of guidelines expressly designed to ensure
that the incremental inaccuracy of plea bargaining does not exceed the limits tolerated by
procedural due process.” McCoy & Mirra, supra note 224, at 925–26. As demonstrated by
plea-bargaining’s innocence problem, no guidelines sufficient to satisfy this need were ever
created.
291
See John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea
Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 449 (2001) (The prosecutor “will offer greater sentencing
concessions in those cases where conviction is less likely, and fewer concessions where she
is more confident of conviction."); Gazal-Ayal, supra note 257, at 2298–99 (“When the
case is weak, meaning when the probability that a trial would result in conviction is
relatively small, [the prosecutor] can assure a conviction by offering the defendant a
substantial discount—a discount big enough to compensate him for foregoing the
possibility of being found not guilty.”); Hessick & Saujani, supra note 224, at 199
(“Assuming the innocent defendant is more likely to be acquitted at trial, the prosecutor has
much higher incentives to enter a plea agreement with the innocent defendant than with a
guilty defendant because the prosecutor perceives the innocence as a lack of evidence.”);
Yin, supra note 90, at 443 (“Curiously, the arena of plea bargaining pits the concepts of
duress and consideration against each other: a large sentencing differential makes it more
likely that a defendant is coerced into pleading guilty, and yet it also increases the benefit
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plea bargains, their bargains are often more generous and, therefore, more
irresistible than those offered to defendants against whom the government believes
it has a strong chance of success at trial.292 As a result, while the Supreme Court in
1970 did not desire that plea-bargaining be utilized to induce the innocent to plead
guilty, it is precisely these defendants who are placed under the most severe
pressure to confess today.293
It is important to note that while plea bargaining’s innocence problem serves
as an indication that we have gone beyond the types of incentives and persuasions
to plead guilty permitted by the Brady safety-valve, the Supreme Court did not
intend that this threshold on pressure apply only to the innocent. Rather, the
innocent serve as a litmus test for plea-bargaining more generally. If prosecutors
are offering incentives that are sufficient to force innocent defendants to plead
guilty, these same types of incentives are equally unconstitutional when offered to
guilty defendants because both sets of defendants are involuntarily entering their
pleas.
Recall that while Brady drastically changed the landscape of American
criminal justice by permitting plea-bargaining, it retained the requirement that all
pleas be “voluntary.” Clearly, the Brady court did not intend “voluntary” in the
plea-bargaining context to retain the restrictive meaning it had held when pleas of
guilt were considered legally identical to confessions, because such a definition
would make almost every offer of leniency impermissible. Instead, “voluntary”
took on a new, although woefully undefined, meaning. 294 To discern what
“voluntary” meant after Brady one must examine the use of this term throughout
Supreme Court precedent.295 In so doing, one learns that the term has less to do
with the type of incentives offered and more to do with the effect of such offers on
defendants. This is why plea-bargaining’s innocence problem serves as a litmus
test for voluntariness generally.

offered in exchange for the guilty plea.”); see also Finkelstein, supra note 257, at 311–12
(“Since it appears that prosecutors’ stronger cases tended to be selected for guilty pleas in
the historical period, while weaker than average cases are selected with greater frequency
today [(1975)], a refocusing of plea bargaining on stronger cases might improve the
statistical picture without adding materially (if at all) to the number of trials.”).
292
See infra note 291.
293
See Covey, supra note 257, at 74, 79–80 (“Plea bargaining has an innocence
problem. . . . In short, as long as the prosecutor is willing and able to discount plea prices to
reflect resource savings, regardless of guilt or innocence, pleading guilty is the defendant’s
dominant strategy. As a result, non-frivolous accusations—not proof beyond a reasonable
doubt—is all that is necessary to establish legal guilt. This latter point forms the root of
plea-bargaining’s ‘innocence problem,’ which refers here not merely to the fact that
innocent people plead guilty, but that the economics of plea bargaining drives them to do
so.”).
294
See supra notes 198–218 and accompanying text (discussing Brady v. United
States).
295
See supra Part I.
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Cases dating back to the eighteenth century, such as Rex v. Warickshall
(1783), imparted a central tenet that has remained true throughout modern times—
admissions of guilt forced from defendants by overwhelming incentives strip such
defendants of free will and must be discredited. 296 In the earliest examples of
American case law regarding guilty pleas and confessions, the Court trumpets this
same overarching theme of free will. In cases such as Hallinger v. Davis (1892)
and Bram v. United States (1897), the Court specifically required confessions and
pleas of guilty to be more than just voluntary—they had to be entered “freely.”297
By the mid-twentieth century, in cases such as Walker v. Johnson (1941), Waley v.
Johnson (1942), and United States v. Jackson (1968), the Supreme Court began
using the term “coercive” to describe guilty pleas and confessions that were not
given freely, but the intent was the same.298 After all, since the fifteenth century
“coercive” has meant to dominate by force or threat.299 By 1962, in Machibroda v.
United States,300 the Supreme Court was once again drawing a clear line between
permissible pleas and those “induced by promises or threats which deprive [the
plea] of the character of a voluntary act . . . .”301 Perhaps no case better summarizes
the concept that guilty pleas must be entered into freely than the first case
discussed in this Article—the case of Beatrice Lynumn. 302 The Lynumn Court
296

See Alschuler, supra note 65, at 12–13.
Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314, 324 (1892); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S.
532, 542–43, 544–48 (1897) (“But a confession, in order to be admissible, must be free and
voluntary: that is, must not be extracted by any sort of threats of violence, nor obtained by
any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper
influence . . . for the law cannot measure the force of the influence used, or decide upon its
effect upon the mind of the prisoner . . . .” (quoting 3 RUSSELL ON CRIMES 478 (6th ed.))).
298
See Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942) (“For a conviction on a plea of
guilty coerced by a federal law enforcement officer is no more consistent with due process
than a conviction supported by a coerced confession.”); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275,
286–87 (1941) (“If he did not voluntarily waive his right to counsel, or if he was deceived
or coerced by the prosecutor into entering a guilty plea, he was deprived of a constitutional
right.”); c.f. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968) (“[T]he evil in the federal
statute is not that it necessarily coerces guilty pleas and jury waivers but simply that it
needlessly encourages them. A procedure need not be inherently coercive in order that it be
held to impose an impermissible burden upon the assertion of a constitutional right.”).
299
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 240 (11th ed. 2003) (definition
of coerce).
300
Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
301
Id. at 493 (“There can be no doubt that, if the allegations contained in the
petitioner’s motion and affidavit are true, he is entitled to have his sentence vacated. A
guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which deprive it of the character of a
voluntary act, is void. . . . Like a verdict of a jury[, a plea of guilty] is conclusive. . . . Out
of just consideration for persons accused of crime, courts are careful that a plea of guilty
shall not be accepted unless made voluntarily after proper advice and with full
understanding of the consequences.”).
302
See Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); see also supra notes 2–22 and
accompanying text.
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stated, where the defendant’s “will was overborne at the time [s]he confessed, . . .
[the] confession cannot be deemed ‘the product of a rational intellect and a free
will.’”303 That Lynumn had a choice when confronted with the possibility of losing
her children was clear, but, as the Supreme Court recognized, the choice was
illusory.304 The incentive to bargain, which she believed meant retaining custody of
her children, was so powerful as to be overbearing and remove any elements of
freedom in her decision. Her confession, though gladly offered, was nonetheless
involuntary.305
When the Supreme Court addressed plea-bargaining in Brady, almost two
centuries of precedent established that the incentives offered in return for a plea
must not be so powerful as to remove the defendant’s ability to consider the choice
and act with “free will.” 306 Though the Court permitted a major shift in plea
bargaining policy in Brady, it certainly did not remove this requirement. In fact,
Brady, Alford, and Bordenkircher all specifically retained the threshold
requirement of free will by continuing to require that all pleas be entered into
voluntarily. 307 In Brady, the Court stated, there may be no “mental coercion
overbearing the will of the defendant.” 308 The same year, in Alford, the Court
reiterated that guilty pleas must be “free and intelligent,” not irrational acts forced

303

Lynum, 372 U.S. at 534 (“We think it clear that a confession made under such
circumstances must be deemed not voluntary, but coerced.”).
304
In his article regarding judicial intervention in plea bargaining, Richard Klein
briefly discusses the similarities between coerced confessions and the activities prohibited
by Miranda v. Arizona. See Klein, supra note 263, at 1419 (“This is an inherently coercive
atmosphere; one which could well cause even an innocent individual to realize that his
most sensible option, indeed perhaps his only option, is to take the plea deal that will never
be offered again. The setting and the pressures are strikingly similar to those the Supreme
Court found to be intolerable in Miranda v. Arizona, where the entire thrust of the suspect’s
interrogation ‘was to put the defendant in such an emotional state as to impair his capacity
for rational judgment. . . . [T]he compelling atmosphere of the in-custody interrogation, and
not an independent decision on his part, caused the defendant to speak.’”).
305
See supra notes 2–22 and accompanying text (discussing the Lynumn confession).
306
See supra notes 296–305 and accompanying text.
307
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970); North Carolina v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25, 37–39 (1970); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978). Even the
American Bar Association report from 1968 seemed to adhere to this basic tenet of plea
bargaining as it was then understood. See ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, supra note 77, at 29 (“The court should not accept a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere without first determining that the plea is voluntary. . . . The court should []
address the defendant personally and determine whether any other promises or any force or
threats were used to obtain the plea.”).
308
Brady, 397 U.S. at 750 (emphasis added) (“Of course, the agents of the State may
not produce a plea by actual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing
the will of the defendant.”).
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from the defendant.309 Finally, eight years later, in Bordenkircher, the Court stated,
the key criteria for acceptance of guilty pleas is the determination that the
defendant, in making his or her decision, was “free to accept or reject the
prosecution’s offer.”310 “Voluntary,” therefore, even after Brady, means that the
incentives offered to defendants may not be so coercive as to overbear the
individual’s ability to act freely and decide in a rational manner whether to accept
or reject the government’s offer.
When one considers this definition of “voluntary,” the reason the Supreme
Court created a litmus test regarding innocent defendants to monitor the operation
of the Brady safety-valve becomes evident. Innocent defendants serve as the most
efficient monitor of whether defendants are being afforded the opportunity to
exercise their free will and decide in a rational manner whether to accept or reject a
plea bargain. As the Bordenkircher Court stated, innocent defendants should not be
“driven to false self-condemnation” by the plea-bargaining system. 311 Instead,
innocent defendants should challenge the government in most cases and, though
trials are not perfect, exercise their right to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt before a jury. Where, however, innocent defendants in significant numbers
are not exercising these rights, but are being coerced to plead guilty, such acts
serve as a strong indication that the Brady safety-valve has failed and defendants,
both innocent and guilty, are being overborne by unconstitutional incentives.312
It is important to note that just because plea-bargaining has an innocence
problem, it does not necessarily follow that all plea bargains are unconstitutional.
Rather, the innocence litmus test serves only to alert the Court that plea-bargaining
as an institution has begun to drift into impermissible territory. For instance, few
would argue that a defendant offered six years in prison for pleading guilty or
seven years in prison if he or she losses at trial would be stripped of the ability to
make a rational and free decision because of the polarity of these options. But,
perhaps, the offer in the Lea Fastow case does represent an impermissible
inducement. Did Lea Fastow really have a choice after she was presented with her
309

Alford, 400 U.S. at 38 n.10 (cautioning against accepting “pleas coupled with
claims of innocence” without a factual basis for the plea, so as to protect the “innocent and
. . . insur[e] that guilty pleas are a product of free and intelligent choice . . . .”).
310
Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 (“[I]n the ‘give-and-take’ of plea bargaining, there
is no such element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or
reject the prosecution’s offer.”).
311
Id. (“Indeed, acceptance of the basic legitimacy of plea bargaining necessarily
implies rejection of any notion that a guilty plea is involuntary in a constitutional sense
simply because it is the end result of the bargaining process.”).
312
It is important to note that this Article is not arguing that innocent defendants
should never be permitted to plead guilty. In rare cases, a defendant who is innocent may
nonetheless have an exceedingly small chance of success at trial because of the available
evidence. An example would include a case involving a mistaken, yet convincing,
eyewitness identification. These defendants should be given the opportunity to plead guilty
in return for a benefit. Where significant numbers of defendants are pleading guilty,
however, this serves as an indication of a larger and more systemic problem.
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options? Did Beatrice Lynumn have such a choice? The distinction, therefore,
between plea bargains that are permitted by Brady and those that violate the great
compromise of 1970 is the size of the sentencing differential in each case. At some
point, the sentencing differential becomes so large that it destroys the defendant’s
ability to act freely and decide in a rational manner whether to accept or reject the
government’s offer. The solution to the failure of the Brady safety-valve, therefore,
is to limit the size of the sentencing differentials used to induce defendants to plead
guilty.313
It should come as no surprise that the Brady safety-valve is failing and pleas
are being entered involuntarily by both innocent and guilty defendants, because
prosecutors have been gaining increased powers to bargain for over half a
century.314 As discussed in Part I.B, as prosecutors’ powers to bargain increase, so
too does their ability to create startling sentencing differentials as inducements for
defendants to plead guilty.315 Consider for a moment the sentencing differential for
Lea Fastow: ten years in prison and parentless children versus five months in jail
and a guarantee that one parent will always be at home.
While the Supreme Court did not discuss the relationship between voluntary
plea-bargaining and sentencing differentials in its Brady opinion, the 1968
American Bar Association report on plea-bargaining, which the Court cited with
approval, had some very noteworthy comments.
Assuming that two defendants have engaged in the same conduct under
essentially the same circumstances and that the usual presentence
information as to the two does not materially differ, is it proper to give a
somewhat lower sentence to one defendant because he has consented to
enter a plea of guilty? . . . [I]t appears that most judges consider such
leniency proper if the sentence disparity is not unreasonable.316
313

As various commentators have noted, abolishing plea-bargaining in its entirety
would not only crush the existing criminal justice system, it would eliminate a system that
is beneficial in many ways for defendants, prosecutors, and courts. See, e.g., Covey, supra
note 257, at 83–86 (noting that abolishing plea-bargaining does not solve the innocence
problem, and does not improve the quality or accuracy of trials); Gazal-Ayal, supra note
257, at 2299 (“As many scholars have shown, a total ban on plea bargaining is hardly
feasible in the overloaded American criminal justice system.”).
314
See supra Part I.B (discussing the increases in prosecutorial power during the
twentieth century).
315
See supra Part I.B; see also Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea
Bargaining with Plea-Based Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1238–41 (2008) (arguing that
large sentencing differential forced some innocent defendants to accept plea bargains);
Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View,
54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 204 (2006) (“Two features of our current federal system are
especially concerning in this respect—harsh sentences and steep discounts for pleading
guilty. Together, they may induce even defendants with good odds of prevailing at trial to
accept a plea bargain.”).
316
See ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 77, at 37–38
(emphasis added).
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Thus, even the ABA’s report praising plea-bargaining in 1968 made clear that
when sentencing disparities reach unreasonable levels they reflect an unacceptable
type of bargained justice. 317 The Supreme Court agreed and, therefore, while it
embraced plea-bargaining in the Brady decision, it also created a safety-valve and
a litmus test to monitor its success. As the Court understood in 1970, one can
hardly be expected to make a rational and free decision regarding an offer to plead
guilty when the differences between the offered leniency and the threat of
punishment are staggering and life altering.
Various scholars have discussed the means by which the size of sentencing
differentials may be limited.318 Some have proposed requiring judges to reject plea
bargains that contain significant benefits,319 while others have argued for “fixed
discounts” for those who admit their guilt in court. 320 Regardless of how one
achieves reduced sentencing differentials, however, such reforms are key to
eliminating plea-bargaining’s innocence problem and, at the same time, ensuring
that plea bargains are entered into “voluntarily” by defendants as required by the
Supreme Court’s great compromise of 1970.
Exactly how small sentencing differentials must be to ensure they do not exert
pressure in excess of that permitted by the Brady safety-valve is still unclear and
outside the scope of this Article.321 What is clear, however, is that the sentencing
differentials being offered in a significant number of cases today are too large. As
explained under the express terms of Brady, defendants whose guilt at trial is
almost assured should not require large sentencing differentials to plead guilty and
defendants whose culpability is questionable should not be offered such benefits as
an inducement to waive their right to walk free unless proven guilty by a jury. To
offer staggering sentencing differentials to all defendants violates the spirit of the
317

See id.
See, e.g., Covey, supra note 315, at 1241–43 (discussing the potential of using a
fixed-discount system such as “plea-based ceilings” to limit sentencing differentials);
Gazal-Ayal, supra note 257, at 2299–2300 (discussing the possibility of a “partial ban” that
“would allow prosecutors to extract guilty pleas when defendants are almost certainly
guilty, while forcing them to conduct jury trials when they bring more questionable
charges”).
319
See, e.g., Gazal-Ayal, supra note 257, at 2299–2300 (“The best way to cope with
the innocence problem is to allow plea bargaining only in strong cases and to ban plea
bargaining in weak cases. . . . How would this partial ban work? . . . Courts only have to
reject plea bargains that result in substantial concessions.”).
320
See Covey, supra note 315, at 1241 (“Fixed discounts regularize the guilty-plea
process by establishing a fixed and nonnegotiable discount for pleading guilty.”). Covey
goes on to discuss the advantages to the plea bargaining system that might result from
limiting the size of sentencing differentials. See id. at 1245–46.
321
The author is currently engaged in research designed to determine the impact of
particular sentencing differentials on defendants and ascertain how the relative size of
differentials influences the likelihood that innocent defendants will plead guilty. The results
of this research will be published in a future article that will draw from the definition of
“voluntariness” proposed herein.
318
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Supreme Court’s great compromise and represents an abandonment of the
fundamental tenets underlying the Constitutional rights afforded to all who are
accused of committing a crime.
CONCLUSION
If any number of attorneys were asked in 2004 whether Lea Fastow’s plea
bargain in the Enron case was constitutional, the majority would respond with a
simple word—Brady. Yet while the 1970 Supreme Court decision Brady v. United
States authorized plea-bargaining as a form of American justice, the case also
contained a vital caveat that has been overlooked by scholars, practitioners, and
courts for almost forty years. Brady contains a safety-valve that caps the amount of
pressure that may be asserted against defendants by prohibiting prosecutors from
offering incentives in return for guilty pleas that are so coercive as to overbear
defendants’ abilities to act freely. Further, as a means to discern whether the
safety-valve fails in the future and prosecutors are offering unconstitutional
incentives, the Brady Court in 1970 created a litmus test regarding innocent
defendants. The Court stated that should the plea-bargaining system begin to
operate in a manner resulting in a significant number of innocent defendants
pleading guilty the Court would be forced to reexamine the constitutionality of
bargained justice. That plea-bargaining today has a significant innocence problem
indicates that the Brady safety-valve has failed and, as a result, the constitutionality
of modern day plea bargaining is in great doubt.322
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While plea-bargaining began its rise in the mid-1800s, relatively few plea
bargaining cases reached the Supreme Court until the mid-1900s. There is a procedural
reason for this phenomenon. Those who are coerced into accepting plea bargains, the
innocent and the guilty alike, are happy merely for the chance to receive a benefit rather
than risk the astounding penalties they believe await them if they lose at trial.

